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ABSTRACT 
Deployment operations abroad are a new challenge to the Royal Norwegian Air 
Force (RNoAF). This thesis compares the logistical planning that is carried out in the 
United States Air Force (USAF) and in the RNoAF in order to achieve operational 
effectiveness during deployment operations. 
Logistics relationships, assets and planning tools that influence logistics 
efficiencies in the two air forces are identified and analyzed. By comparing the planning 
process in the two organizations, important factors in the planning, deployment and 
sustainment phases are identified. These factors help determine how logistics efficiencies 
can contribute to operational effectiveness. 
With declining spending on defense, air forces need to improve logistics 
efficiency in order to maintain the required level of operational effectiveness. An air 
force needs to develop the right mixture of logistics investment in structure and assets 
versus efficient logistics processes. In order to achieve the right mixture of logistics, 
knowledge of the interrelated logistical and operational factors is required, and trade offs 
have to be made. 
The thesis recommends that further research be undertaken to determine the 
appropriate factors that contribute to efficient logistics in support of deployments. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
Logistics provides the physical means for organized forces to exercise 
power. In military terms, it is the creation and sustained support of combat 
forces and weapons. Its objective is maximum sustained combat 
effectiveness. (Eccles, 1959) 
The war fighters of the 21st century are expected to be mobile, flexible and 
responsive to a whole specter of military operations. The scenario of where the next 
conflict will take place is uncertain compared to the situation NATO had during the Cold 
War. The new situation means that forces have to maintain and execute the capability to 
deploy to areas where their services are urgently requested. In order to conduct 
deployments successfully, logistics support has to be organized and ready. 
The deployment of squadrons for operation abroad is a new challenge to the 
Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF). Few studies have been written in Norway about 
logistical requirements for squadrons that are expected to deploy for operations abroad. 
Logistics will be an important factor in the planning and execution of deployment 
operations. This thesis gives planners in the RNoAF new insight into how logistics is 
organized and prepared in another air force. 
In addition, this thesis aims to identify and analyze the complexity of logistical 
aspects in the planning, deploying, and sustaining phases of a deployment. It, further, 
discusses the balance of effective1 and efficient logistics support. A comparative study of 
1
 Effectiveness and efficiencies will be described and discussed in Chapter II 
1 
how the planning and execution of those tasks are organized in two different air forces, 
the United States Air Force (USAF) and the RNoAF, may lend answers that can be 
incorporated into future RNoAF logistics system and doctrine. 
B. PURPOSE 
The comparison of these two organizational structures provides logistical and 
operational planners of each air force with new insight in logistical planning. The RNoAF 
has encountered several challenges in adapting a new concept, where deployment for 
international operations is one of the main missions. This thesis will give 
recommendations on how to organize and plan for logistics for future operations. 
C. SCOPE 
This thesis provides background and discusses logistics' role in deployments of 
the USAF and the RNoAF. Major logistical areas important for successfully planning, 
deploying, and sustaining a squadron are identified. 
The requirements an air force encounters while planning, deploying and 
sustaining a squadron for operations will be conducted by comparing the RNoAF concept 
for Immediate Reaction Forces (TRF) and the United States Air Force Expeditionary Air 
Force. This thesis discusses the two concepts and compares advantages and 
disadvantages for both concepts. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis focuses on the logistical requirements a squadron encounters when 
deploying abroad. The analysis is based on literature research from books, theses, journal 
articles and RAND studies, Norwegian Government White Papers and Norwegian Armed 
Forces logistical directives and plans. Interviews of personnel involved in logistical 
planning in both the USAF and the RNoAF have also been conducted. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
In Chapter n, a brief background on logistics' role in deployment operations is 
given. Further, Chapter II discusses the background and changes that have taken place in 
the RNoAF and the USAF operational and logistical concepts. Chapter El discusses the 
logistical challenges the two air forces are encountering and how they are met. Chapter 
IV analyses the two concept and how operational effectiveness can be met by improving 
logistical efficiency. Chapter V provides, conclusion, recommendations and topics for 
further studies. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
II.   OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICS CONCEPTS 
A.       BACKGROUND 
A deployment of military forces to a foreign territory requires operational and 
logistical forces. A logistical force contributes to aircraft availability2 and supports the 
endurance of an operation, which are both a result of the quality of the logistical and 
operational planning. When deployed, the force has to use its own resources or 
established systems so that logistical needs can be satisfied. This support could be 
obtained by bringing logistics with the deploying squadron or establish a responsive 
logistical system. Or more importantly the optimal combination of each. In other words 
the effectiveness of the war fighters is directly dependent on logistics efficiency. 
A typical deployment starts with a planning phase in which forces are prepared 
according to given directives. The actual deployment starts when the plans are carried out 
and the forces are moved either by sea, air or land to the deployment area. The next task 
is establishing the forces in the area where operations are to be based. How well the 
forces logistically perform in the new environment depends on the planning done before 
the deployment. Both the United States Air Force (USAF) and the Royal Norwegian Air 
Force (RNoAF) use some type of planning approach to be self-sustained for a defined3 
period before establishing supply lines. 
2
 In both the USAF and the RNoAF aircraft availability is measured in Fully 
Mission Capable Aircraft (FMC) 
3
 The USAF and the RNoAF use a decided number of days of operation as a 
planning guidance 
5 
The deploying unit brings its own logistics4 elements, which consist of personnel, 
War Readiness Material (WRM), repair and maintenance equipment, and different 
services, for example exchange, dining and lodging facilities. The required logistics sent 
with the deploying units differ depending on several factors, including type of mission, 
length of deployment and the host nation support agreement (HNS). RAND (Tripp, 1999) 
has developed an employment-driven combat-support-requirements model (Figure 1) that 
is helpful in identifying requirements for a deployment. The model shows all factors and 
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Figure 1. Employment-Driven Analytical Framework (From: RAND MR-1056-AF) 
4
 Definition of logistics given in Appendix A 
6 
Mission requirements, such as number of aircraft, type of missions and sortie rates 
have to be balanced with a feasible and available logistical support solution. Operational 
requirements have an effect on the logistics support concepts and vice versa. The 
challenge is to maximize the operational effectiveness with maximum logistics 
efficiency. 
B.        LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES DURING DEPLOYMENTS 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to take into account all factors that can come into 
play during military operations. A statement by Admiral Hyman Rickovers, US Navy, 
best illustrated the challenge: 
To inquire if and where we made mistakes is not to apologize. War is 
replete with mistakes because it is full of improvisations. In war we are 
always doing something for the first time. It would be a miracle if what we 
improvised under the stress of war should be perfect. 
If what Clausewitz (1984: p. 121) describes as "fog and friction" that is "...the 
force that makes the apparently easy so difficult" is added to the complexity of military 
operations, "the force" could, for example, affect the human factor that is meant to work 
under difficult conditions: rugged terrain, geographically difficult areas and demanding 
physical conditions, little to no available information, complex command and control 
systems, and lack of supplies and maintenance of equipment. As a result planning must 
clearly be done to meet and solve the "fog and friction" situations during operations. 
Fog" is what Clasewitz (1984) labels uncertainty: 
.. .which constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war, by 
making things appear entirely different from what one had expected. 
The enemy will not always do what is expected of him. The information that is 
available can be misleading or completely wrong; nevertheless, operations have to be 
carried out. "Fog and friction" increases the need for thorough planning before a 
deployment of military forces. 
The final operational and logistical plans should include enough flexibility so that 
unexpected occurrences can be met. General William "Gus" Pagonis , commander of the 
logistics forces during the Gulf War (Pagonis, 1992), emphasized that all plans made 
during the Gulf War by the coalition force had enough flexibility for them to deal with 
"fog and friction." Carter B Magruder (1991), describes in his book, Recurring Logistic 
Problems As I Have Observed Them, how logistical problems arise again and again 
during military operations. Historical experiences both in the USAF (Magruder, 1991) 
(Pagonis, 1992) and the RNoAF (Ramberg,1997) have shown that it is impossible to plan 
for all circumstances that might arise during a deployment. There has to be a balance 
between a brief framework and a detailed plan that aims to cover all aspects of a 
deployment. It is important that personnel has the opportunity to use its initiative and 
knowledge to solve new and unique problems (Rekkedal, 1996: pp 80-83). 
The goal for the logistics organization during a deployment is to maximize its 
support for the overall mission and the war fighters with the most efficient use of 
resources. Saying this, it also makes sense that deploying wings or squadrons learn 
strategies to avoid mistakes that the organization experienced on previous deployments. 
1.        The Role of Logistics During Military Operations 
Logistics support has proven to be critical for the overall mission when military 
forces have deployed to areas outside their own bases. If logistics support and services do 
not work properly, it affects any chance of completing the mission by efficient and 
suitable means. This belief is also illustrated in a statement by General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, USA (Joint Pub 4-0:2000): 
You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even 
wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics. 
Several historical examples support Eisenhower's statement. One example from 
the Second World War illustrates the effect of operational and logistical relationship (Air 
Force Manual 1-1, 1992). A squadron of 12 B-17 aircraft was deployed from the 
continental United States (CONUS) via the Atlantic, Africa and India to Java to meet the 
Japanese offensive. The aircrafts were loaded with crew members, but not with a logistics 
element. These aircrafts were more or less operational for two weeks before withdrawing 
from the war zone due to need of maintenance and supplies. This example illustrates the 
mobility of air forces, but also its limitation. 
An overall deployment plan must include operational and support forces 
that are responsive to the unified command, sufficient for the anticipated 
duration and types of operations, and suited to the conditions they are 
expected to encounter. Deployment and employment plans must also have 
ample flexibility to accommodate the unforeseen needs that only 
operations can identify. (Liddle Hart, 1974: pp 329-331) 
2. The End of the Cold War 
During the Cold War, Norwegian forces, in contrast to the US forces, were 
expected to operate out of their own home bases or preplanned bases in Norway. This 
lead to the development of a stationary logistical organization focused around the existing 
infrastructure. 
After the end of the Cold War, the Norwegian Armed Forces began . a 
transformation making it suitable for operations abroad. Restructuring is presently taking 
place, and important decisions about the future defense structure are expected to be made 
by the Norwegian Government in the spring of 2001. However, Norway has been 
exposed to the challenge of deployment of forces in operations abroad. Army and 
RNoAF units were deployed to the former Yugoslavia in 1993 as part of the UN-lead 
mission. In 1998 fighter aircraft were deployed to Italy as part of the NATO-lead 
operation "Allied Force" in Kosovo. There is a move towards more operations abroad 
and less emphasis on the defense of the Norwegian territory, among both the political and 
military leadership (White Paper 38, 1999) and (Defence Study 2000,2000). 
The RNoAF is expected to contribute several forces to future operations abroad, 
among them is a fighter squadron: 338th squadron from 0rland Air Force Base (AFB). 
Logistics is an important part of the preparation that has to take place in order to make 
10 
this squadron ready for operations. This dedicated squadron has been preparing for future 
deployments through participating in several exercises and operations. For example as 
part of Allied Force during the war in Kosovo, four F-16s with logistics support elements 
were deployed to Italy. Today, logistical concepts for the RNoAF are still under 
development and lessons have been learned since planning started in 19915. 
Nevertheless, areas still need to be improved and changes to continue. A deploying 
squadron encounters new challenges at each deployment such as: 
• What type of mission and sortie requirements? 
• In which area will the squadron be deployed? 
• What facilities and infrastructure are available? 
• What logistics support should be brought into the area of operation? 
• What is available as Host Nation Support (HNS)? 
The challenge of logistical planning is illustrated in a statement made in the US 
Armed Forces Joint Logistics Doctrine (Joint Publication 4-0,1992): 
Seldom will all logistics principles exert equal influence: usually one or 
two will dominate in any given situation. Identifying those principles that 
have priority in a specific situation is essential to establishing effective 
support. 
The requirements and challenges that the RNoAF encounters in logistical 
planning for its future operations should be similar to what the USAF encounters in its 
5
 Parliamentary resolution of 1991 that the 338th  squadron at 0rland Air Force 
11 
planning for operations abroad. This thesis compares the two systems illustrating how 
challenges are met, and possible solutions for future logistical planning. 
C.        TRANSFORMATION OF THE RNOAF 
1.        The Norwegian Armed Forces in the Past 
During the Cold War the RNoAF encountered numerous logistical and 
operational challenges. Since, Norway was strategically located in the northern region 
next to the former Soviet Union, NATO identified this northern area as one of those 
where a war between East and West was highly probable. Due to this the RNoAF was 
given priority in the operational and logistical planning that took place in NATO. Several 
contingency plans were developed that would direct forces from NATO countries to 
Norway if a tense situation should arise. In order for Norway to host allied forces 
dedicated for deployment; it had to develop its infrastructure and logistics capacity to 
support allied operations from Norwegian territory. 
The mission that shaped the RNoAF during the Cold War was the protection of 
one region of the country. Because of this the air force was centered around the ability to 
deploy the greatest possible force to defend Norwegian territory in the event of a large- 
scale attack against North Norway. An attack of this kind would require a buildup of 
logistics and forces by the aggressor in the East where it could be detected, and provided 
strategic warning. This would make it possible for Norway to conduct mobilization and 
Base, should be the Norwegian contribution to NATO's IRF fleet of combat aircraft    . 
12 
host allied forces deployed to Norway as part of an NATO Article 56 operation. The 
RNoAF's principal tasks during the Cold War was to patrol, control and give warning in 
air space above Norwegian territory and adjacent maritime areas, and to conduct air 
operations against invasion forces (The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2001: pp. 
32-37). 
2.        The New Strategic Concept in NATO Takes Shape 
During the Cold War, contribution of the Norwegian Armed Forces to the defense 
of the NATO alliance was the defense and surveillance of Norway and, especially, its 
northern region towards former Soviet Union. The plan was not to deploy abroad, but to 
defend the Norwegian territory against an aggressor from the East until the alliance 
deployed to Norway. 
At a NATO meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of States and 
Governments agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, 
more promising, era in Europe. The conclusion of the meeting, which was later agreed 
upon by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome through November 7th - 8th, read (NATO Defense Planning 
Committee, 1991): 
6
 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty deals primarily with deterrence against the 
use of force against members of the Alliance and embodies the principle that an attack 
against any one of them is considered as an attack against all. Alliance activities falling 
outside the scope of Article 5 are referred to collectively as "Non-Article 5 Operations" 
13 
NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments 
in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves 
towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to 
Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will 
form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence 
policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture 
and its collective defence planning arrangements. 
The new force structures that reflected the characteristics of flexibility, mobility 
and multinationality identified in the London Declaration took form when three main 
categories of forces were established: Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces and 
Augmentation Forces. These forces met the new security challenges in NATO's area of 
responsibility. The new structures would give NATO flexibility and responsiveness to 
react on the full spectrum of military operations. The Reaction Forces were divided into 
two categories, which were Immediate Reaction Forces (ERF) and Rapid Reaction Forces 
(RRF). A decision was made that the Norwegian Armed forces would dedicate sea, air 
and land forces to the new concept (White Paper No. 46, 1994). Among the forces that 
the Royal Norwegian Air Force would equip and train for future operations was a 
Reaction Force in the category of Immediate Reaction Force (IRF). This squadron 
consisting of 12 F-16s with a support organization would be able to deploy from its home 
base within five days of notification. 
The post Cold War area marked a change in NATO's wartime planning. The 
focus changed more towards Non-Article 5 operations like the engagement of NATO in 
former Yugoslavia. Non Article 5 operations are operations that take place outside the 
defined territory of NATO (NATO Washington Summit, 1999).These low intensity and 
regional conflicts are the most likely scenarios for NATO to encounter in the next 
decades. 
14 
By adapting the new strategic concept, NATO declared its willingness to also 
accept mandates from international organizations (for example the United Nations, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Western Europe Union) to 
carry out Peace Support Operations (PSO) outside the Alliance territory. The term PSO 
reflects a broad spectrum, from humanitarian missions up to peace enforcement 
operations. Most importantly, these types of operations can even involve the participation 
of non-NATO armed forces. A recent example is the conflict in the Balkans. There is 
consensus among NATO nations that PSOs (Non-Article 5) are the types of operations 
most likely to happen. The member nations are expected to contribute equipped and 
trained forces with necessary logistics support for similar operations in the future. 
3.        Response to the New Challenge 
An overarching aim of Norwegian security policy during the Cold War was to 
safeguard its national interests within the framework of the various international 
cooperation processes (The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2001). A broad 
consensus of the fundamental objectives for Norwegian security policy remains as 
follows: 
• to prevent war and contribute to stability and peaceful development; 
• to protect Norway's freedom of action against political and military 
pressure and to safeguard Norwegian rights and interests in the sphere 
of international cooperation; 
• to preserve Norwegian sovereignty. 
15 
Those goals were the same during the Cold War and have remained the same in 
the present process to reshape the RNoAF for future operations. Norwegian defense 
policy has been based on four mutually reinforcing principles: 
• a balanced national defense 
• cooperation with allies and participation in international operations 
• total defense concept 
• universal military service 
One of the main topics in the Norwegian Defense Study 2000 (Defense Study 
2000, 2000) is maintaining a balanced military in the future. According to this study it is 
necessary to build forces that are both able to contribute to the defense of Norway as well 
as to international operations. Future logistical organization and planning is important in 
order to achieve the operational requirements and vice versa. 
Participation in international operations is important for all three services. The 
Norwegian Government has placed a maximum number of 3500 personnel from all 
services that are deployable at the same time. Since Norway will never be the single 
nation that contributes to an international operation and due to its size, the RNoAF will 
always need to cooperate with other nations to achieve an efficient deployment. 
Norway has a conscription force in which airmen serve from six to twelve 
months. The new RNoAF consists of approximately 8500 people and 48 fighter aircraft 
divided among eight bases during peacetime operations. Since Norway has a mobilization 
force, it is possible to mobilize 33,000 people for the RNoAF. However, it is not possible 
to mobilize for operations abroad. Personnel involved in a deployment are volunteers 
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within the Air Force or mobilization force. However, changes in military policy may 
necessitated officers to be ordered for deployment. 
4.        The Defense Policy for the Future 
Defense policy forms the central plank of the Government's security policy and 
the Norwegian Armed Forces represents the principal instrument of this policy. The tasks 
of the Armed Forces can be grouped under nine main headings (The Royal Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence, 2001): 
• anti-invasion defense 
• territorial defense 
• crisis management 
• preservation of sovereignty and exercise of authority 
• intelligence service 
• security service 
• participation in international operations 
• search and rescue service 
• support to the civil community. 
These functions have provided guidelines for the development of Norway's 
Armed Forces. In its development policy makers have emphasized the importance of 
creating a force that is not only able to participate in anti-invasion, but also international 
operations (Defense Study 2000, 2000). 
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5.        The Road Ahead 
Future conflicts in the immediate area around the Norwegian border are expected 
to be more limited with regard to both the forces involved and the geographic area. This 
is a direct result of a possible conflict in Norway that would no longer be an outlying 
aspect of a major East-West war in Europe, but would be a regional issue - resources, 
security, or some other matter. Additionally, a crisis could escalate from a purely political 
confrontation to an armed conflict much faster than in the past (Defense Study, 2000). 
This makes it of far greater importance than up to this time to be able to quickly reinforce 
the standing military presence on the Norwegian side without having to go through a 
time-consuming mobilization of the kind Norway was dependent on during the Cold 
War. 
As a result, the underlying structural priorities of the armed forces have changed, 
with responsive and deployable capability becoming more important than volume (Godal, 
2001). To achieve the required readiness, logistics has to be properly planned and 
organized to ensure efficient use of forces. 
The Ministry of Defense issued a White Paper No. 14 in 1992 (White Paper No 
14, 1992 ) and followed up with a new White Paper No. 46 (1993), stating that the armed 
forces are expected to contribute forces for operation abroad as part of NATO, UN or 
other international organizations. These requirements have increased as time has passed 
(White paper No. 22, (1997-98)), and White Paper No. 38 (1998-99). The Defense study 
2000 is, also, based on the assumptions that the RNoAF and the other services are 
expected to contribute forces for operations abroad. One of the main system components 
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the RNoAF decided to design and equip for international operation is the F-16 squadron 
located at 0rland AFB. This squadron is part of the new NATO's Immediate Reaction 
Force Concept (IRF), a quick and responsive air force that could be deployed into 
operation within NATO's area of responsibility (AOR). 
6. The Solution 
The main premise of the RNoAF has been an air force trained and equipped for 
air defense of Norway. The Norwegian defense concept is built around the NATO 
concept of operations where the RNoAF operates over Norwegian territory to secure 
landing of allied forces. Until 1993 the RNoAF primarily trained and equipped its forces 
for a full-scale war, positioning its forces in different bases around Norway. In 1993 
Norway participated in the UN-lead operation in former Yugoslavia with one helicopter 
wing. During this operation it became apparent that logistics planning had been neglected 
for decades and that the RNoAF logistics concept was not designed for international 
operations (Ramberg, 1997). As part of the new security situation in Europe, NATO 
requested Norway to design forces to fit the IRF concept. 
7. The Defense of Norway and International Operation 
During the Cold War the RNoAF squadrons practiced small scale deployments in 
Norway and to bases abroad with limited logistics support. This challenge for the IRF 
was that few officers had experience in this sort of deployment. At the same time NATO 
reorganized its concept of operations, initiatives from the RNoAF Air Staff were 
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implemented to reorganizing the RNoAF concept. This project, named "Phoenix", was 
built on the concept that the whole Air Force should be more mobile and deployable. 
From 1991 to present, the RNoAF has been working on the concept to make the ERF 
squadron a deployable and sustainable part of a NATO operation. The goal is to take 
advantage of the experiences gained in the ERF concept and make them applicable to the 
development of the new air force organization and structure. The ERF concept has huge 
logistical implications for an organization prepared to operate only out of existing 
domestic bases and infrastructure. 
D.        TRANSFORMATION OF THE USAF 
When General Ryan announced the new Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept 
he described the situation the USAF was encountering with the following words (Ryan, 
98): 
In response to the changing international and geopolitical environment, the 
United States Air Force has embarked on the most significant 
reorganization of its forces in the post-Cold War era. The fundamental 
change for the future is that instead of maintaining the USAF forces in a 
forward-deployed location, it is a move to keep the Units within the 
continental United States and prepare them so that they are ready for rapid 
worldwide deployment. 
General Ryan's statement is supported in the America's Air Force Vision 2020. 
The new USAF is expected to be agile, lean and lethal in the future (America's Air Force 
Vision 2020,2000). 
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The USAF has, since its founding in 1947, been heavily represented overseas at 
forward operated bases both in Europe and the rest of the world. In the past, US air power 
has been applied almost exclusively outside the CONUS. The US has been able to export 
forces and the necessary logistics to locations overseas. 
Unlike the RNoAF the USAF has always been preparing for deployment out of 
the continental United States (CONUS) to bases overseas. This has been one of the 
cornerstones of the defense concept that was developed during the Cold War. To make 
deployment more effective, forces were stationed forward, and strengthened by deploying 
forces and necessary logistics. 
The USAF invested heavily in base infrastructure and logistics at bases they 
planned to use in the event of a war. The experiences from Operation Desert Storm and 
the end of the Cold War changed most of the planning assumption that had been guiding 
planning during the 70-80's. Budget cuts and reduction of forces also forced a change of 
how the USAF would meet future conflicts. 
The destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the end of a bipolar world 
where two superpowers were confronting each other in a world where the United States 
was the only superpower in a world of many regional powers (Tripp, 1999: pp 2-4). This 
new world situation has mandated interventions of US forces in a whole spectrum of 
military operations, from humanitarian relief to a full scale war like the Gulf War, the 
USAF has been involved in most of the operations. The number and frequency of these 
deployments have created ongoing problems for the USAF. Because of force reduction 
during the latter half of the 1990s, deployments are carried out by substantially smaller 
forces than those in the 1980s and even during Operation Desert Storm (Tripp, 1999: pp 
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2-4). The new situation has increased the workload for personnel, especially the 
specialists in critical fields who were sent on frequent and long deployments. This has 
increased the workload on both the deployed personnel and the people left behind who 
must perform the duties of those deployed. The decreased retention, coupled with recent 
declining defense expenditure, has contributed to recent troubling decreases in overall 
readiness (Peters, F. Whitten, 1999). 
In the end of the 1990s, the USAF was caught in a situation requiring a change in 
strategy to solve future deployments in which the USAF was called upon. In August 
1998, the Chief of Staff Air Force (CSAF) held a press conference announcing that the 
USAF was adopting the EAF concept as its basis for responding to small-scale 
contingencies. The CSAF emphasized that there were many details still to be decided, 
and the EAF concept would be the key part of the Air Force's response to the new 
environment (Ryan, 1998). The new concept also involved logistical challenges that were 
unique to the way the USAF had been operating up to that point (Tripp, 1999). 
1. The Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) 
The Chief of Staff Air Force (CSAF) announced that the Expeditionary 
Aerospace Force would be divided into ten Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs), 
each composed of a mixture of fighters, bombers and tankers (Ryan, 1998). 
The concept was that two of the AEFs should supply forces for permanent 
rotations and be on-call during a 90-day period. The forces that would be called upon 
would be tailored in size and/or capability for the specific mission. The period on alert 
would be followed by a 12-month period during which the units would not be available 
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for short-notice deployment rotations. This schedule would create more predictability in 
planning unit activities, such as training and maintenance. The reduction _ of instability 
about sudden deployment would also improve the quality of life for personnel. The 
conceptual planning cycle for the EAF concept is as follows: 
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Figure 2. EAF Planning Cycle 
(From: Newsletter EAF Implementation, Outreach Branch, 
HQ AF/XOPE. Pentagon 26th May 1999) 
The EAF is organized, trained and equipped to deploy and sustain itself in a 
global security environment. The ten AEFs have been put together from various units in 
the US AF representing different air power missions. Two of these AEFs are "on call" at 
any given time for immediate deployment. Formerly units were tasked as needed on an 
ad hoc basis in a more reactive mode and pieced together as a fighting unit after arrival in 
theater. In the future these units will have a set schedule as shown in Figure 2 and will 
train together and fight together. During the Cold War the USAF had far more aircraft 
and personnel forward based in Europe, Asia and other locations (Tripp, 1999). These 
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personnel was ready for any conflict and formed the forward deployed expeditionary 
forces. Today, the USAF has fewer overseas bases, and less personnel and aircraft 
forward deployed. The CSAF announced in his press announcement that a change was 
necessary to meet the future challenge. 
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III. LOGISTICAL PLANNING FOR DEPLOYMENT - EMERGING 
CONCEPTS 
A.        INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on how the two air forces have planned for logistical 
efficiency. Chapter II pointed out the process that the USAF and the RNoAF have and are 
still undergoing adjustment to the operational and logistics concept of the future. In this 
chapter the planning process, logistical organization and the tools available to assist in the 
planning for deployment are discussed. How is the logistical planning process organized 
in the USAF as compared to the RNoAF? How is the deploying wing or squadron 
involved in the planning process? What tools are available for the logistical planners? In 
this chapter these questions are answered while in Chapter IV the two concepts are 
analyzed. 
1.        Assumptions 
For the scope of this thesis it is not feasible to analyze the logistical planning that 
takes places on all the different command echelons in the USAF; therefore the thesis 
analyzes and compares the logistical planning that takes place at the wing/squadron level. 
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2.        What Drives Logistical Planning? 
Allied Logistics Publication (ALP-13,1999) describes the logistics planning 
process like this 
Logistics planning, including movement and transportation planning, 
should be undertaken as an integral part of defense planning and be 
consistent with force and operational planning. It is essential, therefore, 
that both logistics and operations staffs have a clear understanding of each 
others' objectives, requirements and capabilities. 
There are several key words in the quote above that are important to both the 
operational planners and the logistical planners. First, the planning process has to be 
integrated and consistent to make the best and most efficient use of its dedicated forces. 
Second, the planning process requires that the logistical planners understand and know 
the operational requirements. Third, the operational planners need to balance their 
objectives and operational requirements with logistical capabilities. The effect of all these 
factors is that the operational and logistical planners encounter the challenge of balancing 
efficiency with effectiveness in the operations. 
A model (Figure 3) of a logistics and operational planning process is described in 
Naval Logistics Doctrine (NDP 4, 1995). This model shows how logistics and operational 







(Concept of Operation) 
Commander's 
Plan ^" 


















Figure 3. Logistic Planning Process from Naval Logistics (From: NDP 4,1995) 
Logistics can either improve or degrade the use of combat forces and vice versa. 
During the process the logistical and operational requirements have to be discussed and 
balanced to achieve the most efficient and effective use of both logistics and combat 
forces. This model is discussed in depth in both Naval Doctrine Publication 5 Naval 
Planning and Naval Warfare Publication 11 Naval Operational Planning. 
Both the USAF and the RNoAF have encountered the challenge of balancing the 
move of the right blend of combat and support forces, equipment and supplies into the 
deployment.area at the right time. The planning process for developing the right mixture 
of forces and logistics is an ongoing process in the two air forces. The planning and 
preparation can take years; nevertheless, crisis may only allow days or even hours before 
the forces are expected to deploy and be mission ready. This quick turn around time for 
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planning will affect logistical efficiency and effectiveness. Another factor that plays into 
effect is the total logistics resources that are available to the deploying force. Based on 
the agile logistics concept and NATO's principles of logistics, an air force encounters 
limitations on what to bring with the wing or squadron on deployment due to economical 
and efficiency reasons. 
The USAF has numerous squadrons of F- 16s while the RNoAF has only four F- 
16 squadrons, showing that the USAF has more resources available to equip their 
deploying squadrons. This difference in resources was also confirmed by the personnel 
responsible for the logistics support at Mountain Home AFB. They were able to maintain 
high fill rates for the deployable kits. For the RNoAF, pooling of resources and use of 
logistical support materiel are critical since the available resources are limited. In many 
cases the deployable squadron has to bring resources from the other F-16 squadrons 
resulting in a deployment having an negative effect on the mission capability of the 
squadron operating in Norway. On the other hand, these resources increase the 
operational effectiveness of the deployed squadron. 
Both air forces have to balance what to bring during a deployment due to its 
budget and capacity limitations. However, the USAF has a bigger pool to draw logistics 
equipment and supplies from than the RNoAF, since it has so many squadrons that have 
the same support and logistics equipment. The agile logistics concept and the IRF 
concept, the RNoAF is developing, encounter the problem of balancing efficiency contra 
effectiveness. This is illustrated in the following model: 
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Figure 4. Logistics and Operational Efficiency and Effectiveness 
The optimal solution to achieve maximum operational effectiveness could be to 
deploy as much logistics assets as possible to the deployment area. Then the war fighters 
would get the required equipment or service when ever needed. However, as previously 
discussed, that would be an expensive and infeasible way to organize logistics support 
Efficiency refers to the "capacity to produce results with the minimum 
expenditure of time, money, or material" (Websters, 1971: 725). Efficiency thus focus on 
the input-output ratio (Pennings and Goodman, 1977). To be efficient is to do things well, 
either it is logistics support or manning of the logistics support functions. Effectiveness, 
on the other hand, is defined as "productive of results" (Websters, 1971: 724). The focus 
is on doing the right thing and it is determined by an absolute level of either input 
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acquisition or outcome attainment (Pennings and Goodman, 1977). In military terms 
effectiveness can be measured in for example FMC or number of combat sorties flown 
etc. Both efficiency and effectiveness play an important part in organizational 
performance, yet the competition for resources each can interfere with the other, thereby 
resulting in a tension between the two (Roberts, 1998). Efficiency depends on "focus", 
precision, repetition, analysis, discipline, and control" (March, 1995). Effectiveness, on 
the other hand, through the process of adaptation to the external environment like 
meeting the readiness goals and contingencies plan of sorties to be flown etc. 
The most efficient way to organize logistics support often conflicts with the 
combat forces' need for required logistics support, therefore making it the least preferable 
operational alternative. In the model (Figure 4) the best mix is found on the straight line 
between efficiency and effectiveness. If planning is integrated and coordinated efficiently 
in advance, planning can achieve a synergy effect on each area reaching a optimum point 
illustrated by the stars. 
The RNoAF and the USAF have a different option in balancing their logistics 
support for the deploying squadrons. However, the challenges for both air forces are to 
balance logistics efficiency with the effectiveness of the combat forces. In this chapter the 
tools that are used to achieve efficient logistics are described and in Chapter IV, the 
logistics concept of the two air forces is incorporated in the model based on the findings 
of the two systems. 
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3.        A Model to Analyze the Logistical Planning Process 
The logistical planning process for realizing an efficient logistics system is 
analyzed in a model, developed for this thesis, that also gives an overview of the inputs 
factors in the planning process. This model is a framework of the findings on how 
logistical planning is conducted in the two air forces. 
Overarching Factors 










Figure 5. The Logistics Planning Process 
Based on the model showed in Figure 5, the following research questions were 
developed: 
•    How is logistical planning organized in the two air forces? 
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• What requirements do the air forces encounter during the planning phase? 
• How is the planning conducted in the two air forces? 
This thesis compares the logistical challenges that the USAF and the RNoAF 
encounter when planning for deployment and sustainment of wings or squadrons, such as 
the AEF and IRF. 
B.        OVERARCHING FACTORS 
1.        Logistics Strategy and Policy 
Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans 
of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the 
troops to this point (Joint Publication 4-0, 2000)7. 
This quote is from General Jomini, a French general serving under Napoleon. He 
wrote the book "The Art of War" in .1838 (Jomini, 1996) in which he discussed the 
relationship between logistics and operations. The principles he pointed out are based on 
the warfare from the 19th century. However, the relationship between logistics and 
operational planning that is discussed in his book is still valid today. Jomini divided the 
art of war into five branches, strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering and tactics. 
Since logistics was an important factor in the whole planning process. Jomini's 
masterpiece still has valuable lessons for the military planners of today. 
7
 General Antoine Henri Jomini, Precis de l'Art de la Guerre (The Art of War), 
1838 
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To understand an air force's logistic concepts, it is necessary to know the 
organization's logistics strategy and policy. The strategy and policy decided at the upper 
command echelons provide input into the planning that takes place on the wing and 
squadron levels. 
2.        Logistics Strategy and Policy in the USAF 
America's Air Force Vision 2020 - "Global Vigilance, Reach and Power" 
(America's Air Force Vision, 2000) gives guidelines for the development of the USAF. 
According to the vision, the Air Force is built upon following core competencies, 
aerospace superiority, information superiority, global attack, precision engagement, rapid 
global mobility and agile combat support. The vision says that combat support will be 
more agile and streamlined than in the past. The Air Staff plans to reduce the forward 
support footprint (logistics) by 50 percent, which means that the logistics support system 
must be more efficient. Because of this, the air force will rely on distributed (or reach 
back) operations to sustain the deployed forces in the future. The USAF strides to 
develop a system or process that is fast, flexible, responsive providing reliable support, so 
that the deployed forces are as effective with 50 percent less logistics footprint. The 
scope of this thesis, demonstrates how this strategy is transformed into planning that 
takes place at the wing level in the USAF organization. 
The Air Force Vision 2020 concludes that the air force has returned to its 
expeditionary roots as a means to organize itself. The "new" Air Force consist of ten 
deployable Aerospace Expeditionary Forces or AEFs. Two, AEFs are always deployed or 
33 
on call to meet the current national requirements, while the remaining force trains, 
exercises and prepares for operations. Logistics is emphasized as an important factor in 
the AEF concept. Focusing on developing Expeditionary Combat Support (agile 
logistics) capabilities that underpin the ability to operate anywhere. Information 
technology, rapid transportation and the strengths of both the organic and the industrial 
logistics base are emphasized in the vision as critical to achieving a responsive, 
dependable and precise logistics support (efficient logistics system). 
The term "lean logistics" was introduced in the USAF to describe the change that 
had to take place in the aftermath of the Cold War. The change required a move from a 
heavily staffed presence with most of the logistics support deployed forward with the 
forces, to a more lean logistics organization with the resources in the rear or located in 
the CONUS. 
a)        Agile Logistics 
Agile logistics (formerly lean logistics) represents a large and 
revolutionary concept on how to organize logistics support for an air force. The concept 
was initiated in 1992, when it first changed the aircraft maintenance concept of 
repairable avionics and engines (RAND MR-1075-AF, 2000). Agile logistics focuses on 
a fundamental shift in the way the USAF approaches logistics support. Logistics support 
is changed from a forward located supply system to a transportation-based supply system. 
Instead of maintaining large inventories and manpower to support them with the 
deployed forces, the USAF has worked to improve efficiency by using integrated 
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information systems to locate and order spares and then optimizing express transportation 
services to expedite delivery. Logistics efficiencies and operational effectiveness are a 
result of the combination of deployed assets and the quality of the logistical processes 
F(X) = (Assets, Processes). This relationship is illustrated in the model below. 
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Figure 6. Logistics Assets Versus Logistics Processes 
The agile logistics concept covers all the logistical challenges that an air 
force encounters today. The challenge is how to deploy an air force that is lighter, more 
flexible, quicker and more responsive than in the past and still be able to support 
sustained operations meeting the operational requirements? Another important question is 
how the logistical organization should be organized. The agile logistics concept has 
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proven to be beneficial on the strategic level, but how is it implemented on the wing and 
squadron level in the USAF organization? 
3.        Logistics Strategy and Policy in the RNoAF 
Since the RNoAF has Had a defined operational mission during the Cold War, 
most of the logistical preparation was to maximize the use of available resources to 
increase necessary logistical strength for sustaining operations until allied forces were 
deployed to Norway. This concept did not require mobility, responsiveness and the 
flexibility that are important factors in the new security environment. Today it is 
uncertain where the next deployment will take place, which demands different 
requirements from the logistical planners. 
During the Cold War the planning assumptions were based on an Article 5 
operation in which allied forces would be deployed to Norway. Therefore the logistical 
planning was based on NATO documents like, MC 319/1 (Military Committee - NATO 
Principles and Policies for Logistics) (SNLC, 1997) and NATO Logistics Handbook 
(NATO, 1998). NATO has published several documents that give requirements for its 
dedicated forces, for example ACE Forces Standards. Those documents have been 
incorporated in the planning that has been conducted in the RNoAF. 
The RNoAF has never operated independently, but has always been deployed as 
part of an larger multi-national operation. Therefore the multinational aspects of an 
operation have been important in the planning phase. NATO has published its logistical 
principles in MC 319/1 that should be applied to the member nations' logistical planning. 
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The logistical principles that should be observed by the member nations are as follows 
(SNLC, 1997): 
1. Responsibility: Nations and NATO authorities have a collective 
responsibility for logistic support of NATO's multinational operations. 
2. Provision: Nations must ensure, individually or by cooperative arrangements, 
the provision of logistic resources to support their forces allocated to NATO 
during peace, crisis and conflict. 
3. Authority: The NATO Commander at the appropriate level must be given 
sufficient authority over the logistic resources necessary to enable him to 
employ and sustain his forces in the most effective manner. The same should 
apply for non-NATO Commanders of multinational forces within a NATO led 
operation. 
4. Cooperation: Cooperation among the nations' and NATO authorities is 
essential. For non-Article 5 operations, this cooperation must be extended to 
non-NATO nations, the UN, the WEU, the OSCE, and NGOs as appropriate. 
5. Coordination: Coordination of logistic support between NATO and national 
authorities is essential and must be carried out at all appropriate levels and 
also with non-NATO nations, the UN, the WEU , the OSCE and other 
organizations as required. 
6. Sufficiency: Levels and distribution of logistic resources must be sufficient to 
achieve designated levels of readiness, sustainability and mobility to provide 
the required military capability during peace, crisis and conflict. 
7. Economy: Logistic resources must be used effectively, efficiently and 
economically. 
8. Flexibility: Logistic support dedicated or organic to operational formations 
must be as dynamic, flexible, mobile and responsive as the operational 
formations themselves. 
9. Visibility: The exchange of information between nations and NATO 
concerning logistic assets and capabilities is essential for the efficient 
management and coordination of support to NATO forces. 
These principles have changed over the years with the alliance moving away from 
mainly focusing on Article 5 operations to also covering Non-Article 5 operations . The 
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decrease in the NATO nations' defense budgets have forced the alliance to look into new 
ways to ensure logistics support to its war fighters. The most important change has been 
the change in the principle - responsibility. Earlier logistics was a pure national 
responsibility, but now it is emphasized as a collective responsibility. 
Based on the principles pointed out in MC/319 and the NATO Logistics 
Handbook, the Norwegian Armed Forces has developed a Directive for Logistics 
(FSJDIR, 1998), published by the Chief of Defense-Norway (CHOD). This directive is 
the source for all logistical planning that takes place in the Norwegian armed forces. The 
directive consist of one general chapter, another chapter with common logistical 
directives for all services and finally a chapter giving guidelines for service logistical 
planning. Since Norway has relied on a total defense concept, this directive is also used 
to incorporate the services and logistical support that should be supported from the 
civilian sector in case of a tense situation, crisis or war. Each service has their own 
chapter where its guidelines for the logistical planning are given. The purpose of the 
Logistics Directive is to give planning directions, so that the RNoAF MC and the 
individual bases and squadrons can plan for logistical support. 
The RNoAF has not developed a long term vision like the USAF. However, when 
the RNoAF started a major reorganization named "Phoenix"in 1995, logistics was one of 
the areas that needed to be researched and developed. The decision to state a clear vision 
on how logistics should be organized and prepared for the future was not developed. A 
project was started in 1998 to define the logistical concept. This concept was published in 
2000, but did not go into effect since Defense Study 2000 announced a completely 
reorganizing of the Norwegian Armed Forces including the RNoAF (Defense Study, 
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2000). Nevertheless, this Defense Study 2000 emphasizes that logistics for the future has 
to be mobile, flexible and responsive (efficient) so that it can support both national 
defense and deployable operations. 
The CHOD-Norway has given his guidelines for logistical planning in the 
Logistics Directive. He stresses the importance of an integrated logistical and operational 
planning and makes several attempts to improve the planning process. In the future all 
logistical activities in the armed forces will be organized under one command named 
Forsvarets Logistikkorganisasjon (FLO) or translated into English the Armed Forces 
Logistics Organization. This organization showed in Figure 6 covers all three services' 
Material Commands. 
The Norwegian Armed Forces Future Logistical 
Organization 
Department of Defense 
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Figure 7. The Armed Forces Logistics Organization (From: White Paper No. 55) 
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The expectations are that this organization will reorganize the way the services 
have planned for deployment operations. This is a move towards joint planning and 
conducting of logistical operations, to achieve economies of scale and best practice in the 
way the service organizes its logistical support. 
C.       LOGISTICS DOCTRINE 
Doctrine consists of the fundamental principles by which military forces 
guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is the linchpin of 
successful military operations, and Air Force doctrine is meant to codify 
accumulated wisdom and provide a framework for the way we prepare for, 
plan, and conduct air and space operations. In application, doctrine must 
be treated with judgment but must never be dismissed out of hand or 
through ignorance of its principles (Air Force Doctrine Document 1, 
1997). 
1.        The USAF Air Force Logistics Doctrine 
The US Armed Forces have developed a vast number of different doctrines. 
Among those is the Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations (Joint publication 
4-0, 2000). This doctrine describes how to organize and plan for logistics of joint 
operations. It gives references to other doctrines that are relevant for logistical planners. 
However, it is general in describing the logistical concept, and ,therefore, of limited value 
for the personnel involved in logistical planning at the wing level. The joint doctrine is a 
theoretical framework/background for the logistical planners. This is also the purpose of 
a doctrine; however based on the data gathered from the logistical planners, the doctrine 
was not a tool that they used in their education or day-to-day operation. 
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As the quotation from Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD) expresses, 
doctrine can be a powerful tool in the planning of an operation, logistical or operational, 
especially since it incorporates accumulated wisdom. Therefore, it would be expected 
that logistics doctrine was something that was used extensively among the logistical 
planners. 
USAF has developed its own logistics doctrine, the Air Force Doctrine Document 
40 (AFDD 40, 1994). Both the joint and the air force doctrine emphasize the importance 
of integrated operational and logistics planning. Logistics principles are pointed out in the 
two doctrines. The Air Force doctrine is designed in the same way as the joint doctrine. 
Since the last air force logistics doctrine was published in 1994, it is obsolete compared 
to the changes that have taken place in the USAF. However, the doctrine gives a broad 
perspective on the logistical processes that take place in the air force and the USAF 
logistics principles, and it outlines the importance of different logistics concepts and 
systems. 
The logistical planners at the wing level preferred to use the Air Force Manuals 
(AFM) and Air Force Instructions (AFT) that gave them direction on how to conduct the 
planning. Doctrine was not a tool that was in use during the planning or preparation for 
operations. Most of the individual planners that were asked if they used the doctrine said 
that this was a tool they seldom or never used8. Doctrine was first used as educational 
tool at the Air Force Staff College, where personnel who had graduated from there 
8
 Interviews among the logistical planners at Mountain Home AFB 
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expressed the opinion: "It was very interesting, but it is hard to adapt the doctrine into the 
detailed planning that takes place at the wing level9". 
2.        The RNoAF Doctrine 
The RNoAF developed its first doctrine in 1964. In 1995 the second edition was 
published with the latest version published in 1999. Logistics was integrated in the 
operational doctrine, as part of ground-based support. In February 200010 the joint 
operational doctrine was published. Today, the plan is for the individual services to 
publish their own doctrine in accordance with the principal laid out in the joint doctrine. 
Because of this the Air Force doctrine has to be rewritten so it supports the joint doctrine 
enforcing logistics as an integrated part of both doctrines. 
Since 1995, the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy has been using the air force 
doctrine as part of its education for future officers in all branches. The logistical school in 
the RNoAF (Luftforsvarets Forvaltningsskole) has intensified the use of the doctrine, 
therefore increasing interest and understanding of its use. Shortcomings in the logistical 
part of the doctrine have been identified causing a discussion among logistics and 
operational officers. Like the USAF, the RNoAF has encountered the same challenges on 
how to apply the doctrine in the actual detailed planning for any deployment operations. 
Logistical planners have been given a tool that can communicate with the operational 
9
 Interviews with Maj Hackett and Maj Kephart, Mountain Home AFB January 
2001 
10
 HQ Norwegian Armed Forces: Joint Operational Doctrine, February 2000 
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branch to incorporate logistical requirements in the planning. Based on the information 
gathered from officers in the RNoAF11, the benefits of using the doctrine, despite that it 
had no direct impact on the detailed logistical planning, they emphasized that the doctrine 
helped them to understand more of the whole operational concept and how logistics fits 
into the overall concept. 
D.        LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE USAF 
Basically, an organization military or civilian is a group of people intentionally 
organized to accomplish an overall, common goal or set of goals. Organizations can 
range in size from two people to tens of thousands. Comparing two organization, like the 
RNoAF and the USAF, is a challenge given the different size and number of people 
involved. The common goal or set of goals is similar for these two logistical 
organizations. Even though, the USAF and the RNoAF are organized differently to 
accomplish their common goal or set of goals. These differences are a natural 
consequence of the size and people involved in logistical planning. The organizational 
structure are described in the following paragraphs 
11
 Phone interviews with LtCol Helge I Mäseidväg, Maj Frode Tvinnereim and 
Captain Frank Knudsen from RNoAF in January and February 2001 
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1. Logistics at the Strategic Level 
The USAF is an complex organization (Figure 8) with its Headquarters US Air 
Force (HQ USAF) as the senior headquarters. The HQ USAF, consists of two major 
entities: the Secretariat (including the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary's 
principal staff), and the Air Staff, headed by the Chief of Staff. (Air Force Instruction 38- 
101,1 July 1998). 
HQ USAF 
Air Force Staff 
Secretariat 
Air Combat Command Air Force Material Command US AIR Force Europe 
MAJCOM MAJCOM MAJCOM 
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Figure 8. Organizational structure of the USAF (After: AFI38-101) 
The next level in the chain of command is the Major Commands (MAJCOM), 
which is a major subdivision of the Air Force, directly subordinate to HQ USAF. 
MAJCOM headquarters are management headquarters and, thus, have the full range of 
functional staff. MAJCOMs, in turn, may be subdivided into the following: 
• Numbered Air Force Center 
• Wing 
• Squadron Division 
• Flight 
A MAJCOM can, for example, be either an operational command, like Air 
Combat Command (ACC) or a geographical command, like the Europe (USAFE) and 
Pacific Command (PACAF). MAJCOM can also be, an education and training command, 
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materiel command (AFMC) or space command (AFSPC). The operational commands 
like ACC, USAFE or PACAF have assigned Numbered Air Forces (NAF) that are 
divided into wings and squadrons. 
The USAF has wings and squadrons deployed throughout the world with these 
forces belonging to the MAJCOM responsible for the area in which the squadrons are 
deployed. 
The United States Air Force has one lead agency for logistics development, 
located in the HQ USAF, named Deputy Chief of Staff/Installation and Logistics 
(DCS/IL). It is the lead agency for development of policies and it provides resources to 
deliver effective agile combat support (ACS) for the full spectrum of an expeditionary 
aerospace force (EAF). This agency covers all the aspect of logistics from supply, 
services and maintenance to transportation 12. 
The air force units that are stationed in the CONUS belong to Air Combat 
Command (ACC). ACC has the overall planning responsibility for the numbered air 
forces stationed in CONUS. ACC is responsible for the implementation of the AEF 
concept. Each MAJCOM has a Regional Supply Center that is a centralized office of 
logistics support for individual weapon systems, such as the F-16. ACC is divided into 
the 8th, 9th and 12th Air Force in the CONUS with its Headquarter at Langley AFB 
Air Force Material Command (AFMC) does not play a major role in the logistical 
planning that takes place before a deployment. The AFMC has a more strategic function 
towards acquisition of new weapon systems. However, the result of the work taking place 
12
 AF/TJL web site <http://www.il.hq.af.mil/> 
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in the AFMC has an indirect effect on the availability of spare parts and other resources 
when squadrons deploy. 
2.        Logistics Planning at the Base and Wing Level 
The focus of this section is to analyze the logistical planning at the wing and 
squadron level. The size and number of squadrons in the USAF compared to the size of 
the RNoAF makes it difficult to compare the two organizations structure at the 
MAJCOM level. The USAF has divided the planning differently and has much more 
personnel on staff compared to the staff of the RNoAF. However, the logistical task that 
has to be conducted to ensure a successful deployment should be similar in the two 
organizations. In contrast, what was discovered during the research was that the two 
organizations varied in how the task was organized and accomplished 
a)        Wing Organization 
Background on how logistical planning is organized was collected by 
interviewing personnel from different bases, air force publications, such as AFI and 
AFM, and public sites on Internet. All squadrons that are expected to deploy as part of 
the AEF concept belong to a wing (which is one of several wings in a NAF), where the 
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Figure 9. Wing Organization 
A standard US AF wing will look similar to Figure 9, however there can be 
some differences depending on situational factors. For the purpose of logistical planning, 
the work accomplished in the Operations Group and Logistics Group is of greater interest 
for this thesis. 
b)        Logistics in the Operations Group 
The Operations Group consists of the flying squadrons. The squadron 
includes a maintenance organization for the weapon platforms that are being used. 
Maintenance performed in the squadron is first level maintenance, since the USAF has 
been transformed into a two-level maintenance concept (Air Force Instruction 21-129, 
1998). The flying squadrons have one Flight that cooperates with the Logistics group in 
the planning process: the Sortie Support Flight. According to the AFI (AFI 38-101,1998), 
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it functions as a supply liaison for the squadron. This Flight is also involved in the 
planning for movement of logistics resources belonging to the squadron like for example 
War Readiness Materiel (WRM). Based on interviews with personnel from this Flight at 
Mountain Home AFB, the personnel are required to cooperate closely with the Logistics 
Support Squadron to make sure that the data that were in the IT systems were correct. For 
supplies they had to cooperate with the personnel at the Supply Squadron, especially the 
Combat Operations Support Flight (LGSC). 
c)        Logistics in the Logistics Group 
The Logistics Group consist of the following squadrons (Figure 9): 
Equipment, Maintenance, Logistics Support, Supply, Component Repair, Contracting and 
Transportation. However, there can be organizational variation from base to base 
depending on situational factors. In a comparison between the RNoAF and the USAF 
concept, the mission and organization of the Supply Squadron (LGS) and the Logistics 
Support Squadron (LGL) are studied. 
Logistics Group 
Supply Squadron Logistics Support Squadron Component Repair Contracting Equipment Maintenance 
Figure 10. Logistics Group Organization 
Logistical planning for deployments happens more or less in all the 
squadrons. Nevertheless, the squadrons that coordinate most of the logistical preparation 
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are the Logistics Support Squadron (LGL) and the Supply Squadron (LGS). The 
Logistics Support Squadron has a planning element which uses the tool Logistics Module 
(LOGMOD) and also coordinates deployment through its Deployment Coordination 
Center (DCC), activated during the deployment phase. Since the supply squadron is 
involved in the buildup of necessary logistics support like War Readiness Material 
(WRM) and Base Support Plan (BSP). These two squadrons will be further analyzed in 
this thesis. 
d)        Logistics Support Squadron 
The Logistics Support Squadron (LGL) provides staff support to the 
Logistics Group for the individual flying squadrons and composite wing operations. The 
LGL develops, plans and implements programs for deployments, contingencies, and 
wartime taskings of the Air Expeditionary Wing. Additionally, the LGL manages aircraft 
maintenance training and wing enlisted maintenance manning. The Logistics Support 
Squadron is divided into three flights: Maintenance Training, Logistics Plans and 
Logistics Operations. 
Logistics Support Squadron 
1                                                  1 
Maintenance Training Logistics Plans Logistics Operations 
Figure 11. Logistics Support Squadron Organization 
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Logistics Plans is the coordination center for all logistics' input that is 
provided to the LOGMOD program, Base Support Planning (BSP) and the deployment 
center. One of the important task of deployment planning for LGL is providing and 
directing WRM management. LGL is, therefore, the focal point for base deployment 
exercises, deployment planning, and execution. The squadron coordinates base support 
planning (BSP) and act as the point of contact for support agreements. The LGL also 
coordinates logistics group input for flying schedules, performs analysis, acts as supply 
liaison, directs combat plans and programs, and manages the wing maintenance analysis 
database. 
The personnel working in the LGL use extensively the software packages 
that have been developed at the MAJCOM. Most of the software have given the 
MAJCOM the capability of monitoring logistical status at the wing and NAF level. The 
logistical requirements were incorporated into the programs. If the wing wants to change 
the requirements or allowance of logistical support, they have to request for changes to 
the lead wing or the squadron that are responsible for developing the allowance for the 
weapon platform. If changes are required or proposed, it is done in cooperation with the 
flying squadron and the supply squadron. 
e)        Supply Squadron 
The Supply Squadron (LGS) consists of four flights which also have 
organizational variations depending on situational factors: Combat Operations Support, 
Management and Systems, Fuels Management and Material Storage and Distribution (see 
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Figure 12). The primary focus of these flights is to maintain war readiness while 
supporting the Wing's peacetime and training missions. 
Figure 12. Supply Squadron Organization 
Combat Operations Support Flight coordinates delivery of supplies to the 
deployable units. The Combat Operations Support Flight includes the following sections: 
Receiving, Mobility, Aircraft Parts Store, Readiness Spares Packages, Flight Service 
Center, and HAZMART Pharmacy. Personnel in this flight also take part in deployment 
becoming a section of the Deployment Support Center (DSC) which is a part of the 
deployed LGL. 
The Management and Systems Flight includes the following sections: 
Procedures and Analysis, Funds Management, Customer Service and Training, Inventory, 
Document Control, Computer Operations, and Administration. This Flight is one of the 
units involved making preparations before squadrons deploy, such as providing customer 
training, managing the squadron training program, and being responsible for inventory 
and document control for host supply accounts and satellites. 
The Fuel Management Flight mission is to deliver fuel products when and 
where needed to support the Air Expeditionary Wing in addition to the support of daily 
operations. 
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3.        Focus 
Based on the data collected on the field visits, the logistical planning in both the 
Logistics Plan Flight of the Logistic Support Squadron and the Combat Operations 
Support Flight of the Supply Squadron are comparable to the planning done in the 
RNoAF. Both flights are involved in the actual planning and contributing directly to the 
preparation and administration of a squadron deployment. The other flights are also 
highly relevant, but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Another flight that is crucial to logistical planning is the flying squadron's Sortie 
Support Flight. The personnel in this flight execute coordinated plans staying involved 
during the whole planning process. Based on the data collected on the field trips, the 
Sortie Support Flight personnel were involved in the logistical preparation and planning 
that took place both in the Logistics Plans and the Combat Operations Support Flight. 
The mobility section was the execution element for most of the logistical activities that 
took place in the wing before the squadron deployed from the home base. The Sortie 
Generation Flight relied heavily on the data that were in the LOGMOD. 
4.        Summary of the USAF's Logistical Organization 
The analysis of the USAF logistical organization has identified that the Logistics 
Support Squadron is the lead squadron at the wing level coordinating most of the 
logistical planning for deployment. This conclusion is based on the observation of the 
organization and mission defined for the squadrons in AFI 38-101. These observations 
were  confirmed in interviews of involved  logistical personnel  from the different 
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squadrons13. Summarizing the quality of logistical planning is based on the interaction 
between the following squadrons and flights: 
Figure 13. Main Logistical Players at the Wing Level 
Another important observation is that all involved planners relied heavily on the 
tools developed to conduct logistical planning. USAF has developed several helpful tools 
to assist logistical personnel in the planning process. The whole planning process was 
more or less formalized and computerized and based on databases developed central in 
the USAF organization. This will be discussed later in the chapter. 
E. LOGISTICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE RNOAF 
1.        Strategic Level 
An operational organization chart of the Norwegian Armed forces and the 
RNoAF is presented in Figure 14 below. The operational and logistical requirements are 
13
 Interviews of logistics personnel at Mountain Home AFB 
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set by the operational HQs in North and South. CHOD-Norway is responsible for the 
training and buildup of the forces so that they meet the requirements when needed. 
The Royal Norwegian Air Force 
Operative Chain of Command in Peacetime 
Chief of Defense 
X 
Commander Armed Forces 
South-Norway 
x 


















C|      Bases 
Figure 14. Operative Chain of Command for the RNoAF 
The HQs requirements are published in the CHOD-Norway's Logistics Directive. 
The Air Staff is the lead agency for giving the overall policy for the RNoAF in 
accordance with CHOD-Norway's Logistics Directive. The air staff does not conduct any 
detailed logistical planning for IRF, this task is taken care of by the RNoAF Material 
Command (RNoAF MC) and the involved squadron. The Air Force Staff is responsible 
for the strategy and policy associated with training and construction the squadrons. The 
RNoAF MC is responsible for all procurement and buildup of logistics support, including 
WRM to the IRF squadron in accordance with the operational and logistical requirements 
given by the HQs. The Logistics Directive, therefore, gives requirements to the RNoAF 
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MC, the individual air force bases and the squadrons for plans that have to be developed 
for the deployable squadrons. 
The RNoAF Staff does not have a logistical planning element like the AF/IL. 
However, the Norwegian Armed Forces have a joint logistics function 
(Operasjonsstaben/ Logistikkavdelingen) that has the responsibility of publishing and 
updating the Logistics Directive and giving logistical guidelines for the three services. 
2.        Air Force Material Command 
According to CHOD's Logistics Directive - the RNoAF MC is responsible for 
conducting logistical planning for all RNoAF's forces and giving out directives that 
explain and describe how logistics support is to be carried out in peace, crisis, war and 
international operations (FSJLOGDIR, 1997). RNoAF MC is directly subordinate to 
CHOD-Norway. The Air Force Staff coordinates with the RNoAF MC based on the 
principles of horizontal cooperation (White Paper No. 55, 2000). It is the Logistics 
Management division at RNoAF MC that conducts logistical planning and publishes 
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Figure 15. Chain of Command in the Norwegian Armed Forces (Focus on Logistics) 
It is the RNoAF MC that conducts all procurement of spare parts and military 
designed equipment for the ERF squadron. The planning is done in close cooperation with 
the ERF squadron and its logistical planners. 
. When it was decided that Norway should equip a squadron for ERF, further a 
decision was made to dedicate a plan for the logistics support of this squadron. The plan 
is named "Intemasjonal Operasjons KEE - for Luftforsvarets Innsettings Styrke" (IOK). 
The IOK describes the logistical organization and how logistics support is expected to 
take place. One appendix describes the allowance list of equipment expected to be taken 
with the squadron in case of deployment. 
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3.        The IRF Squadron 
The IRF squadron set up at 0rland AFB has been given the planning task. The 
base has, as a result of the IRF mission, established a planning element to support the 
buildup of the IRF squadron. This planning element consist of maintenance and logistics 
officers. They are working closely together with the RNoAF MC, which is the lead 
agency for logistical planning. The RNoAF MC is responsible for funding, while the 
squadron and RNoAF MC work closely together to work out what needs to be procured 
allowing the squadron to meet the logistical requirements set in the Logistics Directive 
and NATO directives. 
The logistical planners are formed as a project organization outside the normal 
base structure. However, to achieve the goals set in IOK and given in the Logistics 
Directive, the planners have to cooperate with the supply squadron and the maintenance 
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Figure 16. IRF Organization at 0rland AFB 
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F.        LOGISTICAL PLANNING IN THE USAF 
A sound logistic plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should 
be based. If the necessary minimum of logistic support cannot be given to 
the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only 
partially successful14. 
This quote from Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, Commander Fifth Fleet, 
1946, is applicable to logistical planning that both the USAF and the RNoAF are 
conducting in preparation for operations of the 21st century. 
1. Logistical Planning at the Wing Level 
The main logistical planning at the wing is administered as identified earlier in the 
Logistics Group. In the Logistics Group the following squadrons execute most of the 
logistical planning at the tactical level: Logistics Support Squadron and the Supply 
Squadron. The Sortie Support Flight has been identified as the execution unit for most of 
the planning at the wing level. In the next paragraphs the tools that are available to the 
logistical planners are described. These tools are important in the work to achieve an 
efficient logistics system that meets the operational requirements. 
14
 Department of The Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication - 4, Naval Logistics, 10 
January 1995 
58 
2.        Base Support Planning 
The USAF has developed several tools to support logistical planning on the 
squadron and wing level. One tool for logistical planning is a system called Base Support 
Planning (BSP) (AFI 10-404,2000'5). 
Base Support Planning is logistical planning accomplished to support unified and 
specific command wartime operations plans, as well as MAJCOM supporting plans. The 
BSP process supports the way logistics requirements are transformed into actual plans on 
the wing level. The BSP cuts across all functional support areas in a consolidated view of 
the wings' missions, requirements, capabilities and limitations. The BSP plans for actions 
and resources supporting war and contingency operations. The system is in use both at 
the MAJCOM level and at the wing level. The mission of the system is to quantify the 
existing capabilities of any operation location and to provide the foundation for 
conducting feasibility/capabilities analysis for a variety of employment driven 
requirements. At the unit level it represents a capability assessment of the employment 
plans. At the MAJCOM it represents quantifying theater/area of responsibilities (AOR) 
for support capabilities at the strategic level. The BSP identifies the total base resources 
and capabilities and the resources required to support contingency operations. 
The baseline data for the BSP development and updates are the MAJCOM 
OPLANs, the TPFDD and the WAR Reserve Material (WRM) authorization documents 
(Figure 17). The logistical planning at the wing level aims to meet the requirements set in 
15
 Base Support Planning AFI 10-404 Draft 
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the BSP for contingency operations. The MAJCOM and the deploying units can pool 
resources based on the data from BSP when planning deployment to bases abroad. 





TPFDD plan WRM Requirmnets 
Figure 17. Base Support Plan Relations to the Other Plans 
For the logistical planning at the wing level, BSP consolidates the requirements 
set by the MAJCOMs. The wing level make sure that they meet the requirements by 
collecting and feeding the program with data from the flights. 
3. LOGMOD 
Logistics Module (LOGMOD) is computer software that runs on the computers at 
both the MAJCOM, NAF and wing level. It is used to manage the database containing 
the logistics equipment and supplies for Air Force Unit Type Codes16 (UTCs). The 
system consists of several modules which are in use on either the base or MAJCOM 
level. The LOGMOD is maintained and updated by the Logistics Support Squadron. The 
information has to be collected from both the flying squadron and the Supply Squadron. 
16
 Unit Type Code (UTC) A five-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely 
identifies each type unit of the Armed Forces. (Joint Pub 1-02) 
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LOGMOD automates the development and distribution of UTC packages. It 
provides the capability to schedule, monitor, and control movement of cargo and 
personnel via air or surface modes of transportation. LOGMOD also provides standard 
reports for the management of authorized and real-time data to commanders for planned 
or contingency operations. If needed, logistics plans are generated for the different units, 
using the data on missions and number of aircraft that are planned deployed. 
The MAJCOM creates and maintains the standard database of logistics supplies 
and equipment for each UTC in the Air Force. This database is called the Logistics Detail 
(LOGDET). The LOGMOD is also used to tailor or customize plans to the individual 
UTC databases of equipment and supplies for each USAF operational or contingency 
plan. This gives the individual wing or squadron the ability to produce deployment 
package lists for different configurations, For instance, when deploying eight aircraft 
instead of sixteen, the whole package of manning and logistics equipment is different. 
The allowance lists used in LOGMOD are developed and maintained by the lead wing 
and verified by Air Combat Command (ACC). 
The wing level module of LOGMOD contains three subsystems the Logistics 
Force Packaging (LOGFOR), the Logistics Planning Subsystem (LOGPLAN) and 
Deployment Schedule of Events (DSOE). LOGFOR manages the standard database 
(LOGDET) of logistics supplies and equipment for each UTC on the base. LOGPLAN 
manages the plan's unique database of logistics supplies and equipment for each UTC the 
wing is tasked for in the USAF's operational and contingencies plans. The Deployment 
Schedule of Events (DSOE) subsystem provides the information necessary to exercises 
command and control of deployment actions. DSOE is an on-line schedule of events to 
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be used by the Deployment Control Center (DCC) personnel to monitor deployment 
processing status. 
4.        Logistics Contingency Assessment Tool 
Logistics Contingency Assessment Tool (LOGCAT) is an instrument used for 
improved deployment planning at the Air Force wing level. The MAJCOMs and the 
Wing-level reception and beddown planners use the LOGCAT tool suit to conduct a site 
survey of a beddown location and to gather site capability information. The Logistics 
Plan section in the Logistics Support Squadron are the main user of LOGCAT for 
logistical planning at the wing level. LOGCAT is a decision support tool that consists of 




The Beddown Capability Assessment Tool (BCAT) is a decision support software 
program that allows logistics planners to identify the reception-base capabilities to 
support the deploying squadrons. BCAT provides a time-phased comparison of weapon 
system operational and logistics requirements relative to site support capabilities during 
the initial stages of an AEF deployment. The tool relates results of the assessment in 
operational terms (sortie production) and allows the user to identify Limiting Factors 
(LIMFACs) and logistics shortfalls. BCAT improves USAF bed-down and deployment 
planning by automating the approved Base Support Planning process and obtaining data 
and planning factors from existing Joint/ USAF systems. As a result, the logistics planner 
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determines the resources required to support the beddown of deploying forces and the 
execution of combat operations at the beddown location. BCAT performs time-phased 
assessments in terms of operational capabilities relative to the site's organic capabilities 
and follow-on sustainment. 
Unit Type Code Development and Tailoring (UTC-DT) is a tool that analyzes 
operational mission requirements, deployment site conditions and limiting factors in 
overages provided by BCAT assessments to determine optimal equipment and manpower 
listings. UTC-DT analyzes equipment and manpower requirements for a specific 
operational scenario and recommends quantities needed to accomplish the mission. Prior 
to any acceptance, the reception and deployment base planners evaluate the 
recommendations for validity. 
Logistics Analysis to Improve Deployability (LOGAID) is a tool still under 
development. The goals of LOGAID are to reduce the deployment footprint, deployment 
response time, and utilize deployment resources more effectively and efficiently. The 
LOGAID project is a tool that will support the goal set for the agile logistics concept. 
The LOGCAT and its three major initiative have formalized the deployment 
planning process and making it an important tool for the LGL and the personnel that 
conduct site survey before an deployment. Data that previously were stored on papers are 
now fed into the program so that it also can be used more efficiently for later 
deployments. LOGCAT is used extensively among the personnel in the DSC. 
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5.        War Reserve Materiel 
War Reserve Materiel (WRM) is materiel that is required in addition to primary 
operating stocks. This equipment also facilitates obtaining objectives for a deployment in 
the scenarios supported for sustainability planning in the Defense Planning Guidance17. 
The WRM is critical for all logistical planning since it has an direct impact on the 
deploying squadrons' capability to fulfill its missions. The WRM planning takes place in 
the LGS. They have a tool available called, Dynametric Analysis System (DMAS), to 
assist the planners in assembling the WRMs for the individual squadron. DMAS, was 
developed for the USAF, is a forecasting technique software package. The WRM consists 
of spare parts expected to be required during the first period of a deployment. The 
Regional Supply Center will establish supply lines either from CONUS or from the AOR 
to re-supply the deployed squadrons. The WRMs are approved by the system component 
office at the Regional Supply Center in the ACC. 
6.        Deployment Planning 
The USAF has developed a Integrated Deployment System (IDS). IDS consist of 
five independent data-based systems that assist the wing level planners in managing their 
deployment requirements. The system also provides in-transit visibility for the wing's 
assets. 
17
 Defense Planning Guidance see definition in Appendix A 
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• LOGMOD-B (Logistics Module) receives and maintains the cargo portion of 
the wing's required equipment and supplies. It maintains detailed record of the 
logistics supplies that are to be deployed (NATO Stock Number, weight, 
cubic etc.) 
• MANPER-B (Manpower and Personal Module) receives and maintains the 
personnel data for UTCs and tasking. 
• DeMS (Deploymnet Management System) is a unit level program to manage 
personnel and cargo data. It provides units commanders with the ability to 
track information on shots, training, personnel and cargo details. 
• CMOS (Cargo Movement Operating System) is a transportation system that 
automates manifesting movement of cargo and personnel. It also provides in- 
transit viability. It is possible to track the cargo from the home base to the 
deployment location. It can also be monitored from base level or higher 
headquarters. 
• CALM (Computer Aided Load Planning and Manifesting) is a automated load 
planning to ensure proper weight and balance of aircraft cargo load as well as 
optimal use of available cabin limits. 
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This system, IDS is a software package that has computerized and formalized the 
whole deployment operation in the transition phase from home base to the deployed area. 
7.        Supply Lines and Re-supply 
Logistical planning aims to build up the WRM and KITs so that the deploying 
units are self sustained in the first period of a deployment. Up to this point, logistical 
preparation is based on a push concept, which means that the deploying units takes what 
it expects to be required based on the data from the UTC lists. The materiel information 
system makes it possible to communicate with the home base. Nevertheless, the 
deploying unit is expected to coordinate with the Regional Supply Center (RSC) for the 
area where it is deployed (MAJCOM). The RSC is responsible for receiving the 
requested supplies. Because of this they can avoid reaching back to, for example, 
CONUS to get a re-supply. This practice is in accordance with the agile logistics concept. 
There are different means of transporting the supplies, but they are generally moved 
using commercial transporters when applicable. The RSC transports the supplies onward 
to a designated point, where a tactical airlift carries the supplies to the deployed 
squadron. The procedures in the AEF concept on how to organize the re-supply is 
described in detail in several AFIs and in the Commanders' Playbook (ACC, 2000). 
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8. Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data 
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) is also a key document for 
logistical planners. This plan contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and 
personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: 
• In-place units. 
• Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating 
the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation. 
• Routing of forces to be deployed. 
• Movement data associated with deploying forces. 
• Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted 
concurrently with the deployment of forces. 
• Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user 
lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or 
attached transportation resources. 
The TPFDD has impact on all the logistical planning conducted before a 
deployment. It regulates what the deploying forces takes and what support is expected in 
the deploying area. It also influences when to send the cargo and what cargo to send first. 
This operational plan influences how the squadron organizes it logistics in order to be 
fully operational in the deployed area. 
9.        Summarized - Logistical Planning in the USAF 
The description of the USAF conducting is logistical planning for deployment 
shows that the organization has moved into the digital arena. The planning process has 
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been heavily computerized over the last decade. The challenge for planners is to connect 
and feed the systems with available and correct data. The systems are developed over the 
years based on experiences and problems encountered in earlier deployments. The 
requirements are developed and centrally standardized in the organization, which are then 
used for all similar squadrons. 
G.       LOGISTICAL PLANNING IN THE RNOAF 
1.        Size and Concept 
Logistics is, as the NATO definition in Appendix A shows, a combination of 
science and art. The logistical planners try to predict requirements for the deployment 
environment, and the expected usage rates that will be encountered during the 
deployment. Optimizing logistical support is an art in balancing the different 
requirements with available logistics support - not to mention the aspect of "fog and 
friction". The RNoAF does not have the same amount of aircraft and inventory as the 
USAF, therefore, making logistical planning even more difficult. If the deploying 
squadron takes more than it requires, the squadrons conducting training and preparation 
at home are negatively affected. On the other hand, the deploying squadron needs to have 
sufficient logistical support to meet the operational requirements. The balance between 
operational effectiveness and logistical efficiency is a traded off between the deploying 
squadron and the squadrons that are going to operate at home. 
In the logistical planning phase, the RNoAF encounters the same logistical 
challenges as the USAF although the two concept are quite different in size and how the 
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actual planning is conducted. The USAF has formalized most of their planning phases 
(AFI, AFM) and has also developed computerized tools to structure and formalize the 
logistical planning process. The main parameters that direct the planning are updated and 
maintained at the central level in the organization. 
The RNoAF, on the other hand, has approached the challenge of deploying air 
forces abroad as an new and unique task. Its logistical concept and organization were 
developed during the process. This approach gives authority to the individual squadrons 
and requires a close coordination between the RNoAF MC and the squadrons dedicated 
for operations abroad. 
The RNoAF MC has had an important role in directing the development, since it 
has been given the logistical planning responsibilities for all the air force bases and units. 
However, most of the execution and detailed planning has taken place at the 
wing/squadron level18.The whole planning process has enhanced the communication 
between the involved logistical personnel at 0rland AFB. The logistical planners for the 
IRF squadron have, as a result of the unique task, established a close connection with the 
responsible logistics personnel at the RNoAF MC. This is required due to the unique task 
and the RNoAF MC's national planning responsibility. Funding and procurement are also 
managed by the RNoAF MC, which requires input from the IRF squadron. 
The RNoAF established a project when the IRF task was given in 1992. The 
project involved personnel from the IRF squadron and RNoAF MC who developed and 
18
 Phone interviews with Maj Frode Tvinnereim and Capt Frank Knutsen 
February and March 2001 
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reported logistical requirements and shortcomings This project established the framework 
for the logistical planning process to prepare IRF for international deployments. 
2.        Organization at the Execution Level 
The RNoAP is going through a reorganization process, so the organization will be 
slightly different from base to base. Logistical planning by the IRF is conducted as a joint 
effort at the base level, managed by the IRF planning staff. This staff is linked to the 
RNoAF MC and to the Air Staff. The chain of command is through the base commander, 
however the planning staff is the addressing unit for logistical questions together with the 
Maintenance Squadron and Supply Squadrons. The IRF staff works closely together with 
the maintenance squadrons and the Supply Squadron in the development of logistics 
support. 
RNoAF Air Force Base 
Base Commander 






2nd level maintenance 
I 
Adminstration Group 
"Base Support Group" 
1 st Level Maintenace Supply Squadron Maintenace Back Shops 
Figure 18. Organization at the Execution Level 
The IRF planning staff cooperate with the Supply squadron in maintaining and 
developing requirements for the squadron in case of a deployment. It is a joint effort to 
meet the requirements with the allowance list being approved by the RNoAF MC. The 
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Supply squadron is also responsible for the day to day support on the base. Due to the 
workload on the Supply Squadron, the decision was made to establish the ERF planning 
element to ensure proper buildup of the IRF squadron. The logistics element is the point 
of contact for all logistics issues concerning the ERF squadron. 
3.        Planning Requirements 
The logistical requirements for the committed forces, which are dedicated 
international operations, of the RNoAF are given in DOK 219. The requirements state the 
number of days in which the squadron should be ready to deploy and the number of days 
of supplies are required to be stocked. In addition to DOK 2, the CHOD-Norway 
published the Logistics directive giving guidelines for all logistical planning, either in 
national defense or international operations. The directive is still under development, but, 
when finished, it will cover all aspects of logistics according to the NATO definition of 
logistics20. 
The RNoAF MC is responsible for publishing and maintaining the logistical plans 
for the ERF squadron. The RNoAF MC has published a plan, named Luftforsvarets 
Insettingsstyrker - International Operations KIT (IOK) covering all the aspects of 
logistics necessary for conducting operations with the IRF squadron. This plan has been 
developed in close cooperation with the squadron. However, the responsibility for 
19
 DOK 2 is the medium-term to long-term planning document for the Norwegian 
Armed forces. 
20
 Definition in Appendix A 
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publishing and updating the plan is with the RNoAF MC. The deploying squadron has 
also developed detailed plans on how it will conducting a deployment, also incorporated 
in the IOK plan. The development of the IOK plan was, additionally, also coordinated 
with NATO and national publication. The aim is to meet the logistical requirements set 
by NATO and national authorities. In comparison with the USAF most of these plans are 
paper-based. 
4.        Tools 
The planning for the IRF squadron and the other RNoAF deployable squadrons 
has been a team effort among the different branches and command levels. There were no 
previous experiences to follow when the planning for IRF started. Since all planning had 
been directed towards deployment to its own bases or operations out of its own bases. 
The USAF has, over the last decade, developed several tools to assist them in planning 
for deployment operations. The RNoAF, on the other hand, has only a computer-based 
materiel information system (Integrated Material and Administration System -EVLA.S). 
This program assists the logistical planner to meet the requirements for Class supplies 
(NATO Class I-V supplies). 
Moreover, there is an ongoing effort in NATO to develop new deployments tools 
like the Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS) to assist in mobility and 
movement management during NATO operations. This system has features like 
movement, sustainment and transportation planning, deployment analysis, force tracking. 
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However, theses tools are not integrated into the existing system and are still under 
development. 
The lack of a centralized computer based network enforces the need for close 
cooperation with all involved squadrons and commands to achieve efficient logistical 
planning. Given the size of the RNoAF, it is not required to have the amount of available 
tools that the USAF. The logistical planners have continuous communication with the 
key planners both in the Air Staff and at the RNoAF MC. On the other hand, as shown 
for the USAF, the planning process in the RNoAF could unquestionably benefit of having 
some tools that would support the logistical and operational planning process. 
5.        The RNoAF MC and the Deploying Squadron 
The RNoAF MC is responsible for planning the class supplies that the deploying 
squadron requires in case of an deployment. To assist in the planning for determining the 
requirements, a discussion is required between the technician and the logistics people to 
develop an allowance list. The allowance list is based on previous deployment and 
analysis of information used when operating from home the base. The information used 
for planning purpose are collected from the HVLAS system since the RNoAF does not 
have tools like the USAF's DMAS. 
Another shortcoming is the limited resources available for investing in class 
supplies, especially spare parts and test equipment. This shortcoming is overcommed by 
dedicating certain supplies from other squadrons, in the case of a deployment. The 
RNoAF MC is responsible for all acquisition of military supplies to the weapon system. 
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Therefore, the squadron and the RNoAF MC has to cooperate closely during the entire 
process. This cooperation requires information and problems to be exchanged and 
solutions to be worked out in collaboratively. 
6.        Logistics Under Deployment 
The IRF squadron, when deployed, establishs a Logistics Coordination Cell at its 
home base. This cell is responsible for all logistic support for the deployed squadron. If 
the home base is not able to satisfy the request, the request will be forwarded to the 
RNoAF MC. The home base coordinates the re-supply along with the RNoAF MC. The 
transportation to the deployed squadron is managed by the RNoAF MC, since they have 
the knowledge and expertise to manage requirements, like getting the re-supplies through 
customs in the deployed country. The re-supply process requires close cooperation 
between the home base and the RNoAF MC to locate where to obtain the material and 
how to transport the re-supply to the deployed forces. 
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IV. COMPARISON OF THE TWO LOGISTICS CONCEPTS 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
To compare two logistics concepts, like the USAF and the RNoAF, is a challenge. 
First, there is a big difference in size and the number of people involved in the two 
organizations. Secondly, the two organizations have evolved differently. The USAF has 
been deploying overseas since it was founded, while the RNoAF has always been 
preparing for defense, operating from Norwegian territory. Thirdly, the USAF has a 
greater pool of logistics resources than the RNoAF due to the vast number of squadrons 
and aircraft. 
In both air forces, organizational structure and tools available are the results of the 
organizational development and operational experiences during the Cold War, which now 
have to be transformed to the concept of the 21st century. 
An effective and efficient logistics organization is a vital part of an air force's 
strategic management process. The challenges of the USAF and the RNoAF forces do not 
lie with strategic decision-making. The manner in which the agile logistics concept of the 
USAF is described shows the importance of logistics at the strategic level. The RNoAF 
has not developed as clear a strategic plan as the USAF, since most of the long term goals 
are described in the CHOD- Norway's Logistics Directive. The missing part in the 
RNoAF strategic plan is how the organization is expected to reach the goals set in the 
directive. However, the logistics strategy in the RNoAF is aimed at meeting the NATO 
requirements. The RNoAF, nevertheless, can benefit by developing a strategy similar to 
75 
the agile logistics concept. In this strategy, the main area of the future logistics concepts 
should be incorporated. By doing this, shortcomings in the existing structure and concept 
would be visualized. The focus would then be placed on how to develop a structure and 
system supporting the long term strategic goals. This would improve the relationship 
between short term and long term goals in connection with developing a structure that 
supports flexibility, responsiveness and sustainability of the logistics and operational 
organization. 
The main logistical challenges encountered by the two air forces is balancing 
operational effectiveness with logistical efficiencies. This goal, of reaching the optimal 
balance, is a function of the system design, structure, mission, organization and 
operational requirements versus logistical support concepts and available resources. Both 
the USAF and the RNoAF are moving towards a more flexible, mobile, deployable and 
responsive system that requires the forces to maximize the operational effectiveness by 
improving the logistics efficiencies. This thesis shows that the USAF and the RNoAF has 
and will decidedly balance those two factors differently in the future. This difference is 
due to the USAF possessing more available resources than the RNoAF given the size of 
the USAF and structure of the existing organizations. 
B.        BALANCING EFFECTIVENESS WITH EFFICIENCY 
In Chapter II Figure 1 (Employment-Driven Analytical Framework) a conceptual 
model of the relationship between operational requirements, such as type of mission and 
weapons, number of sorties, was balanced with the logistics support concepts available. 
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These requirements need, as shown in Chapter m Figure 3 (Integrated Planning Process), 
to be balanced to maximize the effectiveness and efficiencies of both the operational and 
logistical assets. Figure 1 in Chapter II also demonstrated how a different logistical 
concept contributes to a certain risk, flexibility, cost, spin-up time and logistics footprint 
depending on which factors are emphasized in the planning and deployment phase. 
The USAF has proven to be effective on deploying their squadrons and the new 
AEF concept (Dowdy, 2000). However, one of the main criticism of the old concept was 
that the organization and the logistical footprint was too big, affecting the spin-up time 
and cost. However, based on the amount of logistics brought into the area, the deploying 
units were both able to be operational effective while maintaining sustained operations. 
The uses of the logistics resources were not efficient, since the old concept required many 
more assets deployed than necessary to meet the operational requirements. 
If the main focus of the air force was only effectiveness at the cost of efficiency, 
the challenge would be to get funding to support investment in logistics assets so that the 
required level could be achieved. A situation like this is presented in Figure 19, where 
operational requirements are met by investing heavily in logistics assets and very little in 
process efficiencies. The figure shows that it is possible to buy effectiveness (illustrated 
by $), but it requires defense spending to be directed to assets for improving the 
effectiveness of the operational forces. The investment could be in, for example, 
logistical organization, maintenance assets or spare parts. 
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Figure 19. Relationship Effectiveness Versus Logistics Investment 
The deploying forces have been able to meet the operational requirements like 
number of sorties and sustained operations. This has been achieved at the cost of an 
inefficient logistics system. The logistical cost of inefficiencies is, for example, too many 
people, spare parts and equipment being deployed. These logistical assets could be used 
in other operations or deployed to other contingencies, if necessary. The challenge 
remains to select the right mixture of logistical assets combined with efficient systems 
that contribute to the required level of operational effectiveness. 
The agile logistics concept aims to reduce the logistical footprint, be more flexible 
and reduce the logistical cost. Based on the graph in Figure 20, the USAF wants to make 
a shift rightward by improving the logistics processes in order to meet the operational 
requirements. Their goal is to achieve the operational requirements with less investment 
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in assets and improve the performance of the logistical systems. The total cost (illustrated 
by the $) is less than by only investing in assets (Figure 19). 
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Figure 20. Improved Logistics Processes Versus Investment 
•   The rightward shift is less expensive since improving a process is less expensive 
than investing in structure and/or logistical assets. A process improvement is also more 
flexible in adapting to future changes like implementing new weapons platform or 
organizational configurations. 
The RNoAF can learn an important lesson from this process: how to improve the 
operational effectiveness by investing in efficient logistics systems. The situation of 
deploying forces abroad is new, and given the resources, Norway does not have the 
specter of opportunities to design such a logistical concept as the USAF has. The RNoAF 
does not have excess logistics assets, and the deployments that have taken place as part of 
exercises or during operation Allied Force demonstrated that the IRF squadron had to 
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pool or share the resources from the remaining squadrons. If the IRF brings too much 
logistics asset to an operation, it will affect those squadrons in Norway training for their 
primary mission, the defense of the Norwegian territory. This means that the deploying 
squadron needs emphasize developing an efficient logistics system that supports and 
meets the operational requirements. This challenge of meeting the operational 
requirements in Norway and for deployment operations are illustrated in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. The Logistics Balance 
The RNoAF cannot afford to be inefficient when they solve logistical support for 
the deploying squadrons. Graphically illustrated the RNoAF logistical system has to 
support the operational effectiveness by operating on a line with least logistics cost 
(marked with $), and with the most efficient processes. This is illustrated in Figure 22. 
Since the RNoAF does not have the amount of available resources that the USAF does, 
they have to be extremely efficient in the way logistics is planned, procured and delivered 
to reach the goal of the operational requirements. 
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Figure 22. Improved Logistics Efficiency 
To develop an efficient logistics system requires trade-offs between logistics 
assets and resources (i.e. parts, manpower, tools) and logistical processes (i.e. deliver 
means, computer programs). In Chapter DI the logistical organization, and tools available 
in the USAF and the RNoAF were discussed. The USAF has been able to maintain the 
effectiveness at the cost of relative inefficient logistics systems; however, they are now 
developing systems that can improve the logistical efficiency in order to maintain the 
same level of operational effectiveness with fewer resources. 
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C.        HOW TO IMPROVE LOGISTICS EFFICIENCIES? 
Efficiencies of the logistical systems depend on how responsive the system and 
the designed process are meeting the war fighters' requirements. For the logistical 
planners it means developing the optimal mixture of assets in respect to the 
responsiveness of the logistical processes. Graphically this can be illustrated as follows: 
Logistics Assets Versus Logistics Processes 
Investment in Logistical 
Assets to Achieve 
Operational Effectiveness Achievable effectiveness level with the 
mixture of deployed assets and processes 
Investment in Logistical 
Processes to Achieve 
Operational Effectiveness. 
Logistics Processes 
= Budget Constraint 
Figure 23. Logistics Assets Versus Logistics Processes 
The two straight lines in the figure cost the same amount, but the solid line 
provides greater return because the process is less expansive than investment in logistical 
assets. 
The quality and efficiencies of the processes can greatly reduce the need for 
deploying logistical assets. When a need arises in the deployed area, the logistical system 
is able to response quickly to meet the demand in the deployed area. If proper planning 
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has been conducted before the deployment, the need for logistics meets with the most 
efficient solution either in obtaining supplies in the deployed area or re-supplying from 
the most efficient logistics provider. This is in accordance with the agile logistics 
concept; however, as shown in Figure 19, logistics influences the ability to meet the 
operational requirements and, therefore, emphasizes how to develop a responsive system 
capable of meeting the operational requirements. 
1.        The Law of Diminishing Marginal Return of Investment In Processes 
In the last decade, as described in Chapter HI, the USAF has invested heavily in 
developments of information systems. These developments are expected to increase the 
efficiencies of the logistical processes so that the USAF can achieve the goal of reducing 
logistics footprint during deployment. However, the RNoAF still encounters challenges 
in developing the right mixture of information systems and logistical assets to achieve the 
goal of operational effectiveness during deployments. The law of marginal returns on 
investment is applicable to military investment either as spare parts or an information 
system. As shown in Figure 24 a certain amount of investment contributes to an increase 
in the level of effectiveness; however, at the point of N in the figure, the effect of further 
investment will be marginal and the investment could be spent more effectively on other 
aspect of the logistics support to improve the overall effectiveness. This methodology can 
be applied to all the trade off studies of logistics. The challenge is to maximize the effect 
of the investment, which contributes to the required level of effectiveness in the most 
efficient way. 
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Diminishing Marginal Returns to Process Improvement 
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Figure 24. Diminishing Marginal Return on Investment 
Cost is an important factor in planning; however, for the design of logistics 
effectiveness, this has to be balanced with requirements to meet the war fighters' need. 
Some assets might have to be deployed because they are critical to the operational 
effectiveness, whereas other assets can be stocked at central or regional warehouses. The 
solution, would be determined in the integrated planning process that takes place in 
accordance with Figure 3 in Chapter HI. In military business all solutions might not be 
cost effective, but they will contribute to the goal to achieve the best relationship between 
logistics and operational accomplishment. This challenge is similar for the RNoAF and 
the USAF; however, given the size and number of command levels, the RNoAF is in a 
better position than the USAF to get the integrated process flowing. As shown in Chapter 
ELI the RNoAF do not has all the different echelons of command level that are involved in 
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the planning. If the RNoAF develops a strategy on the importance of how to reach the 
goal, they are in a favorable position of to streamlining the logistics system to be more 
efficient in meeting the operational requirements. If not, the logistics processes can result 
in inefficient logistical systems that badly affect the deployed forces as well as the forces 
operating at home. 
D.   WHAT CAN THE RNOAF LEARN FROM THE USAF 
The EAF concepts show that the USAF has taken further steps in designing the 
whole Air Force to meet future deployment contingencies. The agile logistics concept is 
the overarching framework for the logistical changes that are going to take place. This 
concept is applicable to those challenges encountering by the RNoAF in the 
transformation of deploying squadrons for international operations. The RNoAF cannot 
afford to bring masses of logistics and personnel for deployment. The deployment to Italy 
in 1997, as part of Operation Allied Force, showed that the amount of logistics support 
brought by the squadron negatively influenced the capabilities of conducting the 
operational training and missions for the squadron in Norway. In order to support a 
deployment efficiently, the RNoAF has to research and investigate the right combination 
of efficient logistics processes and investment in logistics assets in order to meet both the 
domestic and international operational requirements. 
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1.        Logistics Organization 
The RNoAF has a much flatter organization, compared to the USAF, which 
should help the deploying squadron to communicate needs and requirements up through 
the organization. It is important that the organization's leadership develop a set of 
guidelines directing them in achieving their desired logistics support. If the goal is to 
maintain a flexible, responsive and deployable logistics organization, it requires the 
whole organization being designed to support the goals. In this sense, organization means 
structure, systems and tools available to support and conduct deployment. 
The static organization from the Cold War cannot support the requirements of a 
flexible and responsive organization. The wing and squadron organization in the USAF 
have all dedicated people in their organization for deployment, which means they operate 
together on a daily basis. The RNoAF has until now relied on mobilizing personnel from 
different bases to be able to conduct a deployment. This does not support the goal of a 
flexible and responsive logistical organization. The wing and squadron has been divided 
into many different functions that require coordination. The RNoAF has an advantage 
since, due to is size, that its personnel are expected to cover more functions and therefore 
coordination and communication do not need to involve the amount of people that seem 
to be necessary for the American squadrons. This disadvantage of limited personnel 
dedicated for deployment in the organization, creates more of a spin up time before the 
squadron is properly trained and ready for deployment. 
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2.        Logistical Tools to Improve Efficiencies 
Over the years, the USAF has developed several helpful tools for logistical 
planners. These tools were developed based on challenges and problems faced by the 
USAF on numerous deployments. In a sense the tools represent organizational learning 
which avoids repeating the same mistakes done on previous deployments. Most of those 
tools should be studied by the RNoAF for possible support of deployment planning in 
general and during deployments. Some of the tools are of general use, like LOGCAT and 
TPFDD, which can be applied to all services. Other tools are more directed toward a 
particular use by air forces, covering several aspects of the logistical planning. Today, the 
RNoAF has only EVLAS, a material and administration system. That does not cover all the 
challenges of logistics for deployment. The plan is to develop more modules in EVLAS so 
that it will also cover logistics for deployment; however, the RNoAF would be better off 
investigating some of the modules that are already developed, for example those in the 
USAF. 
Logistics efficiencies have to be achieved by combining and balancing all the 
logistical factors. All factors are interrelated and trade-off studies identifying a balance 
have to be conducted. Several research studies have been done by Project Air Force of 
RAND on the behalf of the USAF to investigate the possibility of rapid deployment with 
necessary logistics to meet the operational requirements. In the research study A Concept 
for Evolving the Agile Combat Support/Mobility System of the Future (Tripp, 2000), the 
study discuss how to balance the different logistical factors so that the operational 
requirements can be met, and at the same time be responsive. The conclusion is that trade 
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offs have to be made in both organizational structure, logistical assets and the actual 
deployment scheduling. The USAF has a much broader geographical area where missions 
are to be carried out; nevertheless, the logistical trade offs are the same in the RNoAF. 
However, given the size and logistics assets the trade off done in USAF is expected to 
relay more on logistical assets than what seems to be the case for the RNoAF. This is 
illustrated in the figure below. 
Logistics Assets Versus Logistics Processes 
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Figure 25. The Conceptual Balance of Logistics Assets and Logistics Process 
Figure 25 shows that the USAF has necessary resources and organization to invest 
in logistics assets like structure, system, spare parts and equipment to compensate for the 
cost of logistics efficiencies. The RNoAF is not in a situation where investment in 
logistics assets can be exchanged to the cost of inefficient processes. Based on this the 
RNoAF has to invest resources to develop an efficient system to support deployment so 
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available assets are used optimally. This concludes that the RNoAF needs to develop 
reliable and efficient support solutions for deploying forces. 
3.        Logistics During Deployment 
The results of the quality of logistical planning is visible when deployments are 
carried out. For a organization like the RNoAF it makes sense to develop flexible and 
responsive systems that respond to the need of the deployed war fighters, instead of 
investing in logistics assets. If the systems are designed for flexibility and responsiveness 
they will reduce the need for deployable assets, which then can be used more efficiently, 
for example, among the squadrons in Norway. When assets are required in the deployed 
area, the systems need to be efficient and reliable so the deployed squadron can trust the 
system. Efforts that are now being carried out in the USAF are projects like Total Asset 
Visibility (TAV) and Radio Frequency Identification technology (RF) to make the re- 
supply process and, management of the deployed assets more reliable. If those 
technologies are applied, reducing the amount of deployed assets is a possibility. 
E.        THE KEY TO ACHIEVE LOGISTICS EFFICIENCIES 
The RNoAF can save time and improve logistics efficiencies by adapting and 
implementing the already developed tools as described in Chapter JE. A goal is to 
increase the efficiencies and still be able to maintain the operational requirements. This 
will require more integrated planning, than what seems to have been performed in the 
past. The USAF organizational structure makes this integrated planning more difficult, 
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due to the number of levels and personnel involved in the planning process. Another 
aspect that makes it difficult is that most functions, compared to the RNoAF 
organization, are very specialized. The personnel perform their function very well; 
however, it is difficult to see how their individual function interrelated with the other 
planning tasks. This is illustrated in Chapter Id, where logistical planning at the wing 
level is described. The logistics planning functions are divided into the different 
squadrons and flights. Illustrating that something has to be done with the structure and 
system to achieve the goals of a more efficient logistics support in the future agile 
logistics concept. 
The situation is somewhat different for the RNoAF, due to available resources 
and in which manner the planning is conducted. The RNoAF does not have the number of 
planning levels that the USAF has nor does the RNoAF have the available number of 
planning tools. To compensate for that, the communication between the RNoAF MC and 
the deploying squadron must be linked together. The organizational structure has 
promoted communication and discussion with the involved personnel; however, given its 
uniqueness and the new task, much of the effort has been conducted on a trial and error 
basis. Lack of expertise in this sort of operation has hindered the effective and efficient 
use of the logistical assets. However, given the resources that the RNoAF has available, 
more emphasis has been placed on developing flexible and responsive logistics systems, 
since this provides the same level of operational capability with less cost. It is important 
to state, that the RNoAF is still developing the logistics concept and, therefore, much can 
be learned from other forces like the USAF to improve the efficiencies of the system. 
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V.   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.        CONCLUSION 
The RNoAF and the USAF are both encountering great challenges in 
transforming their logistical concept into the scenarios of the 21st century. The USAF has 
met the operational requirements in the past by deploying masses of logistics resources, 
but changes are taking place to adapt to the agile logistics concept. By successfully 
implementing the agile logistics concept, the focus in the organization is on developing 
efficient logistics processes and reducing the logistics assets deployed. 
The RNoAF encounters the challenge of maximizing its use of limited resources 
to support both deployed forces and maintaining the readiness of the forces operating in 
Norway. The comparison of the two concepts shows that the RNoAF can benefit by 
adapting some of the tools uses by the USAF in planning and deploying squadrons for 
deployment operations. As shown in Chapter HI, the USAF has developed several helpful 
tools to assist logistical personnel in the planning process. The whole planning process is 
more or less formalized and computerized and based on centralized databases developed 
in the USAF organization. The USAF has incorporated its organizational learning in the 
tools that are used for planning. In the case of the RNoAF, it is more beneficial to adapt 
some of the tools that are already applicable to the RNoAF environment, instead of 
developing similar tools by itself. 
A successful deployment relies on how well the planning process has been 
integrated before a deployment. By integrating logistics and operational planning, the 
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results are units that are able to maximize operational and logistical effectiveness with the 
least logistical cost. Logistical solutions have to be balanced during the whole planning 
phase and supported by responsive systems and organizations directed to support 
deployed operations. To achieve the goal of an effective and efficient organization, it is 
recommended that the RNoAF move in the direction of a deployable squadron with 
assigned personnel who train and exercise as part of the squadron, instead of attaching 
personnel right before a deployment is carried out. This reduces the spin-up time for the 
squadron, similar to the way the USAF has organized its deployable squadrons. 
The RNoAF has an advantage over the USAF, when it comes to the number of 
command echelons. To maximize this advantage, the RNoAF should develop its 
communication flow between the planning levels. Compared to the American 
organization, the RNoAF can, if correctly managed, bring problems effectively up to the 
level where problem can be addressed immediately. 
B.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.        The USAF versus the RNoAF Organization 
The RNoAF should maintain the organizational flexibility and communication 
between the deploying units and the RNoAF MC. The RNoAF is in a position where the 
number of command echelons can, and should, be kept at a minimum in order to achieve 
logistic efficiency. This aspect is also important to maintain when the new Norwegian 
Armed Forces Logistics Organization (FLO) is established. If there are too many 
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agencies and command echelons involved in the planning it will reduce the efficiencies. 
Experiences from the USAF showed that if to many levels are involved, logistics 
efficiency decreases and investment in logistics assets increases in order to meet the 
operational requirements. 
2. Forces Operating at Home Versus Deployed 
The RNoAF is confronted with the challenge of balancing support to the deployed 
forces without affecting the forces remaining in Norway. Logistics is critical to the 
deployed forces, and based on the experiences from the USAF, there are developed 
information systems that can improve the logistics efficiency in the planning, deploying 
and sustaining phases of a deployment. The RNoAF should investigate the systems that 
are available and research how those systems affect the requirements of logistical assets 
for future deployments. If more reliable systems are incorporated in the planning of 
deployments, logistical assets can be used more economically and efficiently to the 
benefit of the forces in Norway and those that are deployed. 
3. Centralized Planning 
All of the U.S. armed services benefit from collecting other squadrons 
experiences and lessons learned into a central data base (TÜLLS -Joint Universal Lessons 
Learned System). Based on the gathered data, they develop or modify the logistical 
allowance list and organized logistics support. The RNoAF should formalize more of the 
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planning process by identifying how data and experiences are gathered and how those 
experiences are implemented in the planning and conducting of future deployments. This 
could be done by incorporating a lessons learned database, such as that of the USAF. 
Nevertheless, it is important to balance how much of the logistical planning should be 
centralized. A successful integrated planning process requires continuous communication 
between the RNoAF MC and the deploying squadron. 
4.        Operational Effectiveness and Logistics Efficiencies 
The Agile Logistics concept demonstrated how the USAF will maintain the 
operational effectiveness by reducing the logistics footprint by 50 percent. Chapter IV , 
however, showed that there are different decisions that can lead to the same goal. For the 
RNoAF it is recommended to determine the appropriate factors contributing to efficient 
logistics that support deployments and to question how the logistics process could be 
improved in order to maintain the operational effectiveness. The analysis in Chapter III 
and IV showed that it is less expensive to improve the logistical processes than investing 
in logistics assets. 
The right level is a combination of different factors. The goal is to balance the use 
of resources with organizational processes. The RNoAF needs to analyze the effect of 
investment on logistic assets versus process improvement by implementing information 
systems like those available in the USAF. 
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C.       SUGGESTED FURTHER STUDIES 
There are several aspects of the challenges of deploying squadrons to operations 
abroad that are not covered in this thesis. One important topic for the RNoAF in the 
future, is the multinational aspect of logistics support. How can the RNoAF improve its 
logistics efficiencies by cooperating more closely with other NATO countries with the 
same weapons systems. This is also in accordance with the NATO logistics principle of 
collective responsibility. 
It is suggested that further studies be conducted to quantify the trade between 
investment in logistics assets versus improved processes. These are important studies to 
be conducted for the new RNoAF in order to be effective and efficient in the 21st century. 
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APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS 
Logistics defined: 
There are many definitions of logistics and each places a different emphasis on the 
relationship of strategy, tactics, movement and production. In NATO, however, the 
agreed definition of logistics reads as follows (NATO Logistics Handbook, 1998): 
Logistics: 
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of 
forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which 
deal with 
• design  and development,  acquisition,  storage,  transport,  distribution, 
maintenance, evacuation and disposition of material; 
• transport of personnel; 
• acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of 
facilities; 
• acquisition or furnishing of services; and 
• medical and health service support. 
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Ar Combat Command 
Agile Combat Support 
Allied Deployment and Movement System 
Aerospace Expeditionary Forces 
Ar Force 
Air Force Base 
Ar Force Doctrine Document 
Ar Force Instructions 
Ar Force Manuals 
Ar Force Material Command 
Ar Force Space Command 
Ar Logistics Publication 
Area of Responsibility 
Beddown Capability Assessment Tool 
Base Support Planning 
Continental United States 
Chief of Defense 
Cargo Movement Operating System 
Chief of Staff of the Ar Force 
Deployment Coordination Center 
Dynametric Analysis System 
Department of Defense 
Document 
Deployment Support Center 
Deployment Schedule of Events 
Expeditionary Ar Force 
Host Nation Support 
Headquarters 
Integrated Deployment System 
Integrated Material and Administration System 
International Operations KIT 
Immediate Reaction Forces 
Logistics Supply Squadron 
Logistics Support Squadron 
Limited Factors 
Logistics Analysis to Improve Deployability 
Logistics Contingency Assessment Tool 
Logistics Detail 
























Numbered Air Forces 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Naval Doctrine Publication 
Non Governmental Organization 
NATO Stock Numnber 
Operational Plan 
Pacific Command 
Peace Support Operations 
Royal Norwegian Air Force 
Rapid Reaction Forces 
Regional Supply Center 
Senior NATO Logisticians' Conference 
Total Asset Visibility 
Time Phased Force and Deployment Data 
United Nations 
United States of America 
United States Air Force 
United States Navy 
Unit Type Codes 
War Reserve Material 
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